Monday, June 13, 2016

官媒:唯我独尊致「一把手」「不得善终」- 法新社


官媒:唯我独尊致「一把手」「不得善终」

media中国国家主席习近平路透社照片
中国国家主席习近平总揽政治、经济、外交和深化改革等多个中央小组领导人的位置,被指专权,但官方《人民日报》一篇专栏文章指出,作为领导的”一把手”,必须掌握好「把」的界限,若自以为是“老大”,把自己的话当政策而狂妄自大,唯我独尊,往往导致一把手“不得善终”。
侯立虹今(13日)天在该报理论版的《思想纵横》栏目刊登题为《一把手怎样名副其实》的文章,当中并没有点名,但开宗明义便引用中国开国领导人毛泽东的话「大海航行靠舵手」来带出「一把手」的观念,指一把手就是要替领导的单位把好舵,定准方向和目标,这是 “把”的基础。其次,是须把关严,带头反对“四风”。「四风」是指形式主义、官僚主义、享乐主义和奢靡之风,由习近平在2013年中提出。其后,他的讲话成为政策,变成中共党规的一部分。
候总结说,做好一把手,必须掌握好“把”的界限。「有的一把手以为自己是“老大”,把单位当成“领地”而为所欲为,把公权变成私权而我行我素,把自己的话当政策而狂妄自大,把单位变成针插不进、水泼不进的独立王国。这种唯我独尊的权力把持很危险,往往导致一把手“不得善终”。」
他续称,一把手应当抓大放小,但有的一把手生怕大权旁落,「于是“把”权、“把”财、“把”物、“把”人,事无巨细,什么都“把”,结果什么都“把”不好。」
他认为,优秀的一把手,都能“把”住执政为民的关口和党的阵地,创造业绩,无愧于一把手的称谓。

文章刊登后在网上热传,当中虽无点名,但有网民指出,这是拐弯骂庆丰。庆丰包子铺是2013年习近平像普通百姓般排队买包子吃的店。
不过,人民网的网民则只是把文章视为泛泛而谈,留言指教导当官的如何“把”好,只是一个人“单相思”。

These Are the Companies Conservatives and Liberals Hate Most - Fortune

Posted: 07 Jun 2016 07:54 AM PDT

Call it the political retail divide. And it’s getting bigger.
Increasingly in America, it seems, our politics are dictating where we shop and what we consume. Asked on a survey of 10,000 U.S. adults, those who identified themselves as liberals indicated they were more likely to shop at Target. Conservatives showed a preference for Walmart. Liberals likely drink Pepsi. Conservatives, Coke.
Fortune has published the Fortune 500 list of the largest companies in America for over 50 years. This year for the first time ever we commissioned SurveyMonkey to conduct a poll on differences of opinion toward the top 100 companies. Respondents were asked about corporate reputations, trust, influence, and global impact. They were also asked to self-identify as liberal, moderate, or conservative.

Certainly, America’s political and cultural divisions are never more apparent than during a presidential election year. That is true this year as much as any. But those political divisions still exist even in years not divisible by , and they are something that business leaders and brands have to contend with, even when the markets they serve have seemingly little to do with politics.
What the survey found is that there are some striking differences (as well as as some similarities) between the companies conservatives and liberals think are bad for America, even for companies in the same business. The most notable example is Target and Walmart.
Liberals put Walmart as the No. 1 company on the Fortune500 that is the worst for America. They also ranked it as first on a list of companies in the Fortune 500 they would like shut down. Walmart has long been pilloried by the left for what liberals see as unfair wages and for fighting against unions.
Conservatives have concerns about Walmart as well. But higher on their list of companies that they want shut down was Target at No. 4. Walmart ranked at a lowly 10th on the conservatives respondents shut down list. Walmart did rank high on companies that conservatives think are bad for America, but not above some of the big banks.
Liberals on the other hand ranked Target all the way down at No. 62 among companies that they said was the worst for America, and gave it a similar rank for companies that they would like to shut down.
But here’s the thing, when it comes to workers wages and the other issues that liberals care about there is very little evidence that Target is any better than Walmart.
The conservative distaste towards Target could be explained by the the firm’s recent reaffirmation that transgender employees and customers at its stores should use the bathroom that aligns with their gender identities. Many conservatives responded to that announcement by boycotting the store.
The poll did find evidence that Republican minds are changing about companies like Walmart. Pundits have called Donald Trump “the Walmart candidate” for his ability to appeal to downscale voters, but Trump has also attacked large powerful corporations for their indifference to the plight of the American worker, and it’s possible that Walmart is being lumped into this group as well.
There were other areas were liberals and conservatives agreed or were close. When asked which companies on the Fortune 100 are are the “worst for the country,” conservatives and liberals agreed on six different companies, all which placed in the top 10:
  • Walmart 
  • Goldman Sachs 
  • JPMorgan 
  • Dow Chemical 
  • Comcast 
  • Bank of America 
It’s not surprising that Americans on both sides of the political spectrum are skeptical of big-name Wall Street banks like those above. After all, this year’s presidential race has often looked like a competition over who can bash big banks the most, even on the Republican side of the aisle. The same goes for Comcast, a company that hasn’t taken taxpayer bailout money but is one that millions of Americans deal with every day and which hasn’t exactly blown away its largely captive audience with its customer service.
The top four companies that conservatives think are bad for the country that weren’t on liberals’ hit list were:
  • Fannie Mae 
  • Freddie Mac 
  • PepsiCo 
  • Target 
Liberals exclusively had animus for:
  • Exxon Mobil 
  • Tyson Foods 
  • Wells Fargo 
  • Coca-Cola 
The conservative hatred for mortgage insurance giants Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can be easily explained. The two firms are the quintessential example of so-called “crony capitalism” wherein a politically connected firm benefits from its relationship with government rather than its ability to win business on a level playing field.
Liberals one-upped their conservative counterparts by adding yet another large bank to its list of companies that are bad for America in Wells Fargo, while also putting oil exploration giant Exxon Mobil on the list, for reasons likely having to do with climate change. Tyson Foods also made their worst 10 list, reflecting liberal distaste for the mass production processes that are part of the meat industry.
The big head scratcher here is why liberals hate Coca-Cola while conservatives think PepsiCo is bad for the country. Perhaps it has to do their corporate colors. (Coke is red. Pepsi is blue.) Or maybe because it has to do with the general political leanings of where the companies have been based. Coke is in the South. And Pepsi’s headquarters is in the Northeast. But for whatever reason, the Coke-Pepsi political divide is just another sign that when it comes to politics, commerce is less immune than ever.
This article originally appeared on Fortune.com

The Problematic History Behind One of Donald Trump’s Favorite Ideas: Tariffs - TIME


Posted: 07 Jun 2016 07:30 AM PDT

Throughout the 2016 election season, presumptive Republican nominee Donald Trump has made clear his admiration for an idea that hasn’t gotten serious play in American politics for nearly a century: tariffs.
Though his official position statement on trade with China clarifies that his “goal is not protectionism but accountability,” he has said that he favors a 45% tariff on Chinese goods. And it’s not just China: he favors a 35% tax on cars made in Mexico and said “who the hells cares” if a trade war is the result of his policies.
Even aside from the fact that many experts have said that such plans would be illegal and detrimental to the U.S. economy, Trump’s pro-tariff stance may sound a strange note to anyone familiar with the role of tariffs (or: taxes on imports) in American history. Though the subject was a controversial and common one in the 19th century, and could play a major role in presidential elections back then, it’s just not something that most candidates—or citizens—really talk about very much anymore.

So what changed?
For an answer, look to the 1930s. Presumptive Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton was correct when she said in a speech last week that “we went down that road” back then. Though questions over the value of free trade haven’t been entirely absent from political discussion since then, you have to go back that far to see a full-on trade war—and to see what happened next. “In the 19th century there had been sporadic trade wars, but I’d call them more skirmishes rather than wars,” says Douglas A. Irwin, author of Trade Policy Disaster: Lessons from the 1930s. “In the early 1930s it really was a massive outbreak of protectionism.”
Get your history fix in one place: sign up for the weekly TIME History newsletter
Even before that decade, the tariff was on its way out. The early 20th century saw two major nails in the coffin of U.S. tariffs, says Joseph J. Thorndike, director of the Tax History Project. Each corresponds with a different function of a tariff: protecting domestic industry (or punishing foreign industry) and raising revenue.
The first factor was that the U.S. economy was finally, about 150 years after the nation was founded, maturing. As U.S. industry became more able to compete on a global level, there was more incentive to help businesses trade freely with potential customers around the world and less of a need to use the tax code to protect them.
The more important issue, however, came on the revenue side: World War I made the tariff stop doing its job. “Tariffs work very poorly as a way to raise revenue during a war, because ships get sunk and ports get blockaded,” Thorndike says. “Tariffs, which depend on a certain volume of trade, start to raise a lot less money.” The federal income tax had been introduced in 1913, right around when tariffs stopped being able to fund the nation and the war. Democrats—traditionally anti-tariff—happened to be in power during World War I, and they were “more than willing to pick up the slack with the income tax,” says Thorndike.
Then, after World War I but before World War II, Republicans—who favored high tariffs—held the White House for several administrations in a row. And even after tariffs had lost their money-making power, they could be used to please certain constituent groups. A turning point for that strategy came in 1930, with the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff, perhaps the last hurrah of the American tariff. “It was done for political reasons,” Douglas Irwin says. “It’s not like the U.S. was being swamped with imports. The Great Depression hadn’t struck in a big way yet. There’s no economic need for it.”
The act raised tariff rates—which were already pretty high—to record levels. As TIME pointed out while President Hoover mulled whether to sign the bill into law, even though many business experts warned that the tariff could be a disaster, the general consensus was that Hoover would sign because “politically he could not afford to do otherwise.” Sure enough, he signed. The tariff went into effect, and played out just as some of the Cassandras had warned. Other countries around the world retaliated (hence, “trade war”) against the United States by imposing their own high tariffs. Plus, the decrease in trade meant that there were fewer international consumers able to buy American goods. The “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy led to what Irwin calls a “downward spiral in trade.”
As a sign of how bad things got, one early-1930s tax law specified that “whenever the President finds that, under the laws of any foreign country, citizens or corporations of the United States are being subjected to discriminatory or extraterritorial taxes” the President could temporarily double certain taxes for citizens and corporations from that country.
Though there remains debate over whether the Smoot-Hawley Tariff had a significant impact on the Great Depression domestically—or if that would have been bad regardless—Irwin says that “there’s widespread agreement that the trade wars of the early ‘30s were disastrous for the world economy.”
After the shock to the world financial system that was the Great Depression and World War II, the tariff’s days were pretty much through. For one thing, as a revenue source, the income tax was here to stay.
For another, Congress no longer had the power to set tariffs—the President had been given that power, to undo the damage—so they lost some clout as a political tool. Then, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the post-World War II precursor to the World Trade Organization, established international regulations about how and when tariffs could be instituted. Though there remain some tax quirks that would allow punitive tariffs—Joseph Thorndike points out that the current Section 891 of the tax code, which grew out of the 1930s system, still allows punitive taxation (and has gotten some recent attention)—it seems unlikely that Trump’s tariff plan would pan out, even if he were elected. Thorndike says that a “fiscal regime change” is always unlikely without a major revenue crisis, which in the past has usually meant boots-on-the-ground war.
“That, to me, is the central fact of the fiscal history of the U.S.,” Thorndike says. “Things don’t really change until they have to.”