Monday, May 11, 2015

An economic future that may never brighten - Financial Times

May 4, 2015 at 8:27pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b345d172-e1cd-11e4-bb7f-00144feab7de.html?segid=0200783#axzz3ZA6FwqUM

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April 14, 2015 6:46 pm

An economic future that may never brighten

Martin Wolf
The decline in potential growth leads to debate about the savings glut and secular stagnation
It seems at first to be a puzzling scenario, and you might wonder whether it is possible at all: output can be at potential but still not be sustainable. Yet a chapter of the International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook illuminates just this scenario. We may even be living in it.
Output is “at potential” when it does not generate inflationary or deflationary pressure. Sustainability — and I am referring here to financial sustainability, not the environmental kind — is something else entirely. Output is financially sustainable when spending patterns and the distribution of income are such that the fruit of economic activity can be absorbed without creating dangerous imbalances in the financial system. It is unsustainable if generating enough demand to absorb the output of the economy requires too much borrowing, real rates of interest rates that are far below zero, or both.


To see how that predicament might arise, start by imagining an economy that is balanced in the sense that the amount of money which households and businesses wish to save is exactly the same as the amount they wished to spend on physical investments. So far, so good. But suppose growth of potential output then fell sharply. The level of desired investment would also fall, because the needed capital stock would be smaller. But the amount that people wished to save might not fall, or not by as much; in fact, if people expect to be poorer in future, they might even wish to save more. If so, real interest rates might need to decline sharply, to restore balance between investment and savings.
Such a decline in real interest rates might also trigger a rise in the price of long-term assets and an associated surge in credit. These effects would offer a temporary remedy to the faltering demand. But if the credit boom later collapsed, leaving borrowers struggling to refinance debt, demand would then operate under a double burden. The medium-term consequences of excess debt and a risk-averse financial sector would aggravate the longer-term consequences of the weaker potential growth.
The WEO illuminates one important aspect of such a story. Potential output, it argues, is indeed growing more slowly than before. In the advanced countries, the decline began in the early 2000s; in emerging economies, after 2009. (See charts.)
Before the crisis, the principal cause of the slowdown in the advanced economies was a decline in the growth of “total factor productivity” — a measure of the output generated by a given amount of capital and labour. One explanation was the waning of the beneficial economic impact of the internet. Another was the decline in the rate of improvement in human skills. After the crisis, potential growth fell still further, partly because of the collapse in investment. The ageing of the population has also been important.
In emerging economies, too, demographic factors have been at work: the decline in the growth of the working-age population is particularly dramatic in China. Capital growth is also falling after a huge investment boom in the 2000s, again particularly in China. Growth of total factor productivity might also fall in the longer run, as the rate of catch-up on advanced economies slows.
This decline in potential growth leads directly to the debate about the savings glut and secular stagnation. Two important distinctions emerge: between the local and the global, and between the temporary and the permanent. The global slowdown in potential growth casts light on both.
Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, rightly argues that ultra-low real interest rates should not be determined purely by local conditions. In an economy where desired savings exceed desired investment, it should be able to export excess savings via a current account surplus. That is what Germany has been doing. 
Yet difficulties arise. First, as the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman notes, the real exchange rate may just not fall far enough. If so, the economy might suffer from permanent stagnation instead. Second, the rest of the world might be unable to run offsetting deficits sustainably. This was what happened in the run-up to 2007. The deficits run by the US, Spain and a number of other countries as a counterpart to the surpluses of China, the oil exporters, Germany and other high-income economies turned out to be frighteningly unsustainable.
Now turn to the no less fundamental distinction between temporary and permanent excesses of desired savings over investment. The main difference between Mr Bernanke and Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury secretary, is over precisely this.
Mr Bernanke suggests that the conditions generating ultra-low real interest rates are temporary. Obvious examples are the now-vanished surpluses of oil exporters. Again, the pre-crisis current account surpluses of China have largely disappeared. The crisis-induced slump should also be temporary.
Against this, Mr Summers suggests that at least some of the conditions predated the crisis and are likely to be longer lasting. Among these was the weakness of private-sector investment in high-income economies. 
The IMF’s point about slowing potential growth supports Mr Summers. Lower potential growth might then also be less sustainable growth. If so, we might find that the world economy is characterised by weak investment, low real and nominal interest rates, credit bubbles and unmanageable debt in the long term.
Such a disappointing future is not inevitable. But we cannot assume we will enjoy a brighter one. National, regional and global reforms are needed to accelerate potential growth and reduce instability. What form these might take is a subject for another day.

Sunday, May 10, 2015

China: Overborrowed and overbuilt - Financial Times

May 4, 2015 at 7:53pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/8b2ce9c4-a2ed-11e4-9c06-00144feab7de.html?segid=0200783#axzz3ZA6FwqUM



January 29, 2015 6:54 pm

China: Overborrowed and overbuilt

Jamil Anderlini
Its economy has become the world’s largest but a credit-fuelled construction binge threatens growth
©DreamstimeWangjing’s Soho building: analysts fear areas such as the Beijing suburb face a perfect storm of overcapacity, demographic shifts and the potential for local debt crises
The last time China was the world’s largest economy Beijing was a city of about 700,000 people, and its Wangjing district was nothing but a jumble of barren man-made hills built to protect the capital from barbarian invaders to the north. That was 1890. Today, Beijing’s population is more than 21m and Wangjing is an expanse of half-empty or half-built offices and residential towers inside the city’s fifth ring road.China has regained its title as the world’s biggest economy, overtaking the US in purchasing power terms for the first time in 125 years, but this growing suburb provides a stark example of the mounting problems the country faces. The restoration of its pre-eminent position comes just as China steps into the so-called “middle-income trap” and as serious stresses built up over the past few years threaten to come to a head.

With its mix of old apartment blocks and gleaming but empty futuristic office towers Wangjing is typical of the credit-fuelled property construction of the past decade, which boosted growth, but at a high price.
China’s official growth rate of 7.4 per cent last year was the slowest pace since 1990, when the country still faced sanctions in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. The International Monetary Fund has lowered its growth forecast for China this year from 7.1 per cent to 6.8 per cent and predicts the country’s gross domestic product will grow slower than India next year for the first time in decades.
Places like Wangjing are representative of “the huge amount of property stock, the potential for local debt crises and the unfavourable demographic shifts that will cause the real estate downturn to last for at least another three years,” according to Ai Jingwei, a property market commentator.
Although growth of 7.4 per cent (or even 6.8 per cent) remains the envy of slow-growing developed economies in the west it is a far cry from the double-digit average annual expansion China maintained for three decades starting in the late 1970s.
As recently as the start of 2010, China’s economy was expanding by about 12 per cent in a surge of credit and construction unleashed by Beijing to counter the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis.
One of the biggest problems China faces now is that the slowdown is happening even as credit and construction, the main drivers of growth, are continuing almost unabated.
‘Disorderly unwinding’
While Beijing suburbs such as Wangjing are representative of this over-borrowing and overbuilding, the problem is even more acute in smaller cities that will never see the demand for real estate that should eventually catch up with supply in the capital.
When ancillary industries are taken into account, real estate construction makes up about a quarter of China’s $10tn economy, a higher proportion than the US, Ireland or Spain at the height of their property bubbles last decade. Nearly a decade of frantic building has created massive overcapacity and left vast belts of empty apartment blocks ringing most Chinese cities.
Last year, the gravity-defying rises of the previous decade, which have seen prices quadruple in major cities, finally came to a halt. Average nationwide housing prices were down 4.3 per cent in December from 12 months earlier.
But total investment in the sector still increased 10.5 per cent for the year and unsold floor space was up by more than 26 per cent by the end of December, according to official figures.
The data suggests the correction in China’s real estate sector has not even really begun. When the sector starts to contract, which could be as early as this year, the headline growth rate could fall much faster and the country could face a wave of bankruptcies — as well as a possible debt crisis, economists warn.
The “slowdown in China could turn into a disorderly unwinding of financial vulnerabilities with considerable implications for the global economy,” the World Bank warned this month.
The impact is already being felt in global commodity prices, including oil, and in the stuttering performance of economies in Brazil, Germany, Australia and much of Asia, which are increasingly reliant on Chinese demand.
Prices of commodities, such as iron ore and copper — key ingredients in any construction boom, are trading close to levels last seen in the midst of the global financial crisis, and that is before the Chinese construction correction has even properly happened.

The financial vulnerabilities are particularly concentrated at the local government level, where provincial officials have ignored budget constraints and a ban on borrowing to indulge in a credit and construction binge.
Local government debt
By the middle of 2013, the last time the government published any data, outstanding local government debt stood at Rmb18tn, up 80 per cent in just two years. That increase happened even after Beijing forbid local officials from raising excessive amounts of money.
But even as the economy slowed last year and officials were tasked with propping up growth with even more infrastructure investment, local government borrowing appears to have surged again. Partial statistics on local government fundraising shows they sold Rmb1.66tn worth of bonds in 2014, compared with Rmb900bn in each of the two previous years.
As with the continued rise in property investment, the government’s stated goal of deleveraging has not yet begun, which means that when it does the economy could slow much more sharply.
The links between the two biggest risks to China’s economy — the property sector and local government debt — make the situation more alarming.
Local governments rely on sales of land for 35 per cent of their revenues, according to research from Deutsche Bank, and virtually all of their outstanding debt is collateralised by government-owned land that is often seriously overvalued.
In a recent study that raises concerns about the sustainability of current growth rates, Zhang Zhiwei, chief China economist for Deutsche Bank, found that local governments have become the dominant buyers of land in the past few years. To avoid a ban on running deficits local governments have set up thousands of wholly-owned “financing vehicles” that have borrowed money on their behalf from state banks, bond markets and lightly regulated underground institutions.
This process is technically illegal but has been tolerated because it bolstered growth in the wake of the global financial crisis.
As real estate sales have slumped and demand for land from commercial developers has evaporated, local officials have started using these financing vehicles to purchase land from themselves using credit from both state-owned and shadow banks. Officials and analysts worry that this is an unsustainable attempt to boost short-term growth and flagging fiscal revenues.
“In 2015, China will probably face the worst fiscal challenge since 1981 [before growth accelerated],” Mr Zhang wrote in his report. “We believe the fiscal slide [the fall in revenues] is the top risk for the Chinese economy and it is not well recognised in the market.”
As well as the slowest growth in a quarter of a century, 2014 marked the first time the ruling Communist party had missed its annual growth target since the height of the Asian financial crisis in 1998.
Officials and some analysts argue that last year’s goal of “around 7.5 per cent” growth was not really missed because the government, anticipating a slower pace, had made it more of a soft target by introducing the word “around” for the first time. The government is set to announce a growth target of “around 7 per cent” this year.
But even Lou Jiwei, China’s finance minister, tells visiting dignitaries that Beijing will be happy with 6 per cent growth in coming years. In private, he warns that just to maintain that growth will require very high levels of government-led infrastructure investment.
Given the mounting problems at home it is little wonder China’s leaders see the title of world’s largest economy as a burden that brings unwanted attention. In fact, Beijing has so far refused to even acknowledge the new estimates, which attempt to adjust for the relative value of non-tradable goods and services in different economies.
Beijing in denial
“Recently there have been some scholars and media who estimated China’s GDP has already surpassed the US in purchasing power terms, but China and the National Bureau of Statistics do not recognise these opinions,” China’s genial statistician-in-chief said last week as he revealed the country’s latest growth figures.
“The problem comes from not being able to include identical goods in the complex basket of goods you compare [across different economies] — in China’s consumer basket of goods the main food items are steamed buns and rice, while European friends perhaps have a lot of bread in their basket. You can’t really compare them.”
Arguments over the relative value of carbohydrates aside, officials quite reasonably point out that China ranks 89th in the world in terms of per capita GDP, a better measure of the wealth of a population, putting it on a par with the Maldives or Peru. They also argue the latest estimates seriously overvalue the quality of items available in the Chinese market.
“China is only just entering the ranks of middle-income economies and is facing all of these headwinds so it really doesn’t want to accept the global responsibilities . . . of being the world’s number one economy,” says one person who was involved in the heated discussions over the new estimate.
Using the government’s current exchange rates China’s slowing economy topped $10tn for the first time last year, while the US economy is accelerating and is bigger than $17.5tn.
According to research by the British economist Angus Maddison, China had the world’s biggest economy for nearly two millennia and in 1820 it accounted for 33 per cent of the world’s GDP, or about the same proportion the US accounted for in 2000. But by 1890, after decades of internal rebellion and foreign incursions, China had lost its number one spot to the US in purchasing power terms.
Back then China’s exports only accounted for 0.6 per cent of GDP, there were virtually no imports of machinery or other modern inputs and opium still accounted for more than a quarter of Chinese imports.
Today China is the world’s biggest trader of goods and the biggest consumer of everything from iron ore to powdered milk. So unlike the 1890s, when its economy was still largely self-sufficient and had little impact globally, the rest of the world now needs to pay close attention to half-built office towers in the suburbs of Beijing.


Distortions in the data – Is the real growth figure much lower?
Amid all the discussion about China’s growth rate, some economists believe the world’s new biggest economy is already growing much slower than Beijing will admit.
Rodney Jones, who headed the Hong Kong research office of Soros Fund Management from 1994 to 2000 and is credited with predicting the Asian financial crisis, estimates China’s growth rate last year — officially 7.6 per cent — was actually 5.6 per cent.
He argues the headline rate is distorted by the way Beijing calculates value-added output in the industrial and manufacturing sectors. Instead, he uses the government’s own unadjusted industrial production figures to recalculate gross domestic product.
“The lower rate of 5.6 per cent is much more consistent with what we see happening in global commodity markets, and in other indicators like power production,” says Mr Jones, who runs his own advisory firm, Wigram Capital. “It also fits with producer price deflation, which has plagued China for 34 consecutive months — the longest period for the country on record.”
The prices of many commodities are close to the depressed levels they reached in the global financial crisis. Wholesale prices fell 3.3 per cent at the end of 2014 and power generation expanded just 3.2 per cent.
Senior Chinese officials say their plan is to support the economy by continuing to pump huge amounts of credit and infrastructure investment into the system. But they see it as a stopgap measure to give them time to overhaul an obsolete economic model and make growth driven more by consumption, services and innovation.
The question is whether the ruling Communist party can maintain sufficient growth to ensure employment and stave off social unrest in the medium term, while reforming the model that served it so well for more than three decades.

Saturday, May 9, 2015

The US shale revolution - Financial Times

May 4, 2015 at 8:32pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/2ded7416-e930-11e4-a71a-00144feab7de.html?segid=0200783#slide0

April 24, 2015 11:50 am

The US shale revolution

Ed Crooks
How it changed the world (and why nothing will ever be the same again)

Last summer, Juan Ramos had four jobs; now he has none. A year ago, feeling frustrated and underpaid working in health insurance in Florida, he was stirred by stories of the fabulous money that could be made in the oil boom town of Williston, North Dakota. So he made the 1,800-mile journey north to find a town that lived up to all of his expectations. 


A job promised by an acquaintance failed to materialise but it did not matter. He quickly found work doing landscaping, as a nightclub bouncer and with two oil companies, fitting the steel casing used to line wells.
He had no prior experience in oil — his only training was studying videos on YouTube — but that did not bother his employers. He liked the physical work in the oilfield as well as his $24 an hour wages — almost double what he had been making in Florida — and soon he packed in his other jobs and went full-time with one of the oil companies. In four months, he took home $25,000. He was living the dream. “I’d never worked an 18-hour day until I came here. I’d never worked in temperatures of negative 30 degrees,” he says. “I got the opportunity, and I just took it.”
It did not last. In January the company cut his wages to $20 an hour and, soon after that, he was laid off. Kitted out in the roughneck’s uniform of thick beard and dark hoody, he now comes to the state job service office in Williston to polish up his CV. There are still hundreds of jobs in the oil industry on offer here but the number of openings in construction and extraction has fallen by a third since June. A year ago, employers would take almost anyone. Today they can pick and choose.
There are other jobs Ramos could take but he really wants to stay in the oil business. “I’m not going to come out here to work fast food,” he says. “I don’t want to do another job and hate it because it’s not an oil job.”

Innovation of the century

Ramos was brought to Williston by perhaps the most important innovation of the 21st century: the technology for extracting oil from unyielding shale rocks. The Bakken formation, which runs underneath North Dakota and into Montana and southern Canada, is one of the largest oilfields opened up by that revolution. Along with similar oil-producing areas in Texas, it has transformed the outlook for US energy security, created hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs and rattled the leaders of rival oil-producing countries from Riyadh to Caracas. It has also struck a blow against the idea that world oil production is at or close to its ultimate peak. US oil output peaked in 1970, and until 2009 appeared to be in inexorable long-term decline. Now it has been reborn.
“The US is going to give Saudi Arabia and Russia a run for their money in terms of being the world’s number-one oil producer,” says Daniel Yergin, author of the classic history of oil, The Prize. “And that just wasn’t on the cards five years ago. It’s that recent.”
The industry is still evolving rapidly. Flourishing innovation in the Bakken and the other centres of US oil production has turned them into the energy industry’s equivalent of Silicon Valley: crucibles of creative activity where engineers collaborate and compete to push back the frontiers of technology. Ideas being developed here could one day be deployed anywhere in the world, because countries from Argentina to China have their own shale reserves, and are looking to follow the US lead.
While the new oil industry is still in its infancy, though, it is facing its first real test. American oil producers have become victims of their own success. In the past nine months, the flood of new oil supply they created has caused a collapse in the price of crude, which dropped from more than $100 per barrel last June to less than $50 in January.
The price fall has been like a bucket of cold water in the face for Williston and other oil boom towns, waking them up from the frenzy of the past half-decade to a more sober reality. The US oil industry is battling to adapt and survive in these new harsher conditions. The future of world oil markets and, hence, of the world economy, hangs on its success.

The ‘Apple of oil’

Mark Papa remembers the precise moment he decided the American oil renaissance had to happen. Avuncular and mildly spoken, he is the antithesis of the stereotypical two-fisted Texas oilman. But the company he led until the end of 2013, EOG Resources, has been one of the great success stories of the boom, dubbed “the Apple of oil” by the analyst Paul Sankey because of its ability to translate innovation into a profitable business.
EOG came from the most unpromising of beginnings. Its original name was Enron Oil & Gas Company and, until 1999, it was majority owned by Enron, the fraudulent energy group that collapsed in 2001. Having secured EOG’s independence just in time, though, Papa led it to a strong position in the fast-growing shale gas industry.
Innovations driven by an industry veteran called George Mitchell had made it possible for the first time to produce gas at commercially viable rates from formations such as the Barnett Shale of north Texas. EOG was an early adopter of the technology, discovering abundant reserves of shale gas that would provide fuel for power generation and heating, and raw materials for the petrochemicals industry. Unfortunately, many other companies were doing the same.
“The amounts of shale gas that were being uncovered [in 2002-06] were just astonishing,” says Papa, now a partner at the private equity firm Riverstone Holdings. “It was very obvious that there had been just a huge breakthrough in technology, and the amounts of commercial gas available in North America were absolutely mind-boggling.”
Papa’s revelation came in January 2007, when he was presenting at a Goldman Sachs conference alongside a couple of EOG’s rivals, listening to them talking about their vast discoveries and their prospects for rapid growth.
“It struck me like a lightning bolt,” he says. “There were so many companies finding so much gas . . . And I thought: ‘You know, the gas price in North America is about to be ruined for the next 30 to 40 years.’ And I sat there on this panel, looking at the two CEOs on my left and my right, and I thought: ‘I wonder if they realise what has just hit me.’”
In October of that year, at the annual meeting of EOG’s divisional managers in Scottsdale, Arizona, he spelt out the implications of his insight.
“I hate to tell you this, guys,” he remembers telling them. “You have to go back to your divisions and tell your geologists to stop finding gas — stop finding the component they’ve been looking for for the past 40 years of their careers — and immediately switch to finding shale oil.”

The science of shale

When you look at a piece of heavy, tightly packed shale, it seems inconceivable that oil could ever flow out of it. It would be like squeezing blood from a stone. For decades, conventional wisdom in the industry agreed. Shales were known as “source rock”: the places where oil and gas was formed as organic matter was “cooked” over tens or hundreds of millions of years. But geologists generally believed that the resources could be extracted only if they had migrated to “reservoir rock”, typically sandstones, where there were interconnected pore spaces through which the oil and gas could flow. If you drill a well into reservoir rock, the pressure underground can send the oil and gas flowing up to the surface, in a gusher if you are lucky. Traditionally, if you drilled a well into shale, you were wasting your time.

Technology that built a revolutionHorizontal drilling
Traditional oil wells go straight down, but since the 1980s many more commercial wells have gone first down, then round a corner, then out horizontally for another mile or more. Their advantage is that they expose a much greater area in a layer of oil-bearing rock.
Multi-stage hydraulic fracturing
Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, uses water, sand and chemicals pumped into a well to open small cracks that will release the oil or gas. It has been used since the 1940s. Refinements to the technology have opened up previously unyielding shales for first gas, then oil.
Walking rigs
The most modern rigs are able to “walk” from hole to hole on stubby legs, making them more flexible and cheaper to move.

Sand is used in fracking fluids to “prop” open cracks created in the rock so the oil and gas can flow out. Companies are experimenting with various proppants, such as ceramics, which can give better results.

Every well is different, and drilling generates a wealth of data about pressures, types of rock, the way it was fracked, the proppant used. After six years of production, data can be analysed to see which methods and conditions have generated the best results. Deploying that IT effectively is key to the future of the shale revolution.
Advances in two technologies in the late 1990s and early 2000s changed all that, although at first only for gas. Hydraulic fracturing — injecting a mixture of water, sand and chemicals underground at high pressure — cracks the rock to release the gas. Horizontal drilling — sinking a well a mile or more straight down, then a mile or more sideways — made it possible to expose a much greater area of resource-bearing rock. Neither practice was entirely new but refining the techniques and combining them transformed the commercial viability of shale gas.
Yet even after shale gas production had become an established fact, Papa says, the “industry dogma” was that the same could never be true for oil.
Conventional wisdom held that while small gas molecules might be able to slip through the tiny pore spaces in shale rocks, much larger oil molecules could not. “If you had taken a poll in 2005 of 1,000 industry executives, 999 of them would have said you cannot flow oil commercially through shales, because the hydrocarbon size of oil is too large,” he says.
Rather than taking the conventional wisdom on trust, Papa was determined to find out for himself. EOG studied shales using CAT scanners, and concluded that although the pore spaces were small, they were still big enough for oil to flow through them. Even so, when Papa announced his planned pivot to oil, many of EOG’s managers were sceptical.
“You could have heard a pin drop in that room,” he says. “Some of them probably were thinking, ‘Poor Mark, he’s lost his mind.’”
Regardless of their reservations, though, “like good soldiers”, EOG’s geologists dutifully set about looking for oil. What they found was the Eagle Ford shale of south Texas, running from around Austin south and west into Mexico. It was a formation that was known to hold a lot of oil but the rest of the industry had ignored it because other companies could see no viable way to get the crude out. EOG spent a year quietly signing oil leases with landowners, and drilled its first well there early in 2009, using the same techniques of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing that had proved so effective for gas. The results were a spectacular success. By April of the following year, EOG was able to tell investors that it had found reserves of about 900 million barrels of oil.
. . .
While EOG was preparing to drill its first oil well in the Eagle Ford shale, another company called Brigham Exploration was transforming the outlook for the Bakken, 1,300 miles to the north. Hundreds of oil wells had been drilled in North Dakota since 1951, mostly going straight down through the shale to reach the more co-operative reservoir rock below. The state had a mini-oil boom in the late 1970s, achieved by tapping the conventional reservoir rock, but that petered out in the 1980s.
Since 1987, companies had been drilling horizontal wells to tap the Bakken formation but with only limited success. The rock is not a pure shale: most of the oil is contained in a layer of dolomite sandwiched between two layers of shale, making it somewhat easier to tap than the Eagle Ford, but the wells had always been respectable rather than spectacular producers.
EOG had drilled a successful horizontal well in the Bakken in 2006, near the town of Parshall, east of Williston. But that still seemed to indicate potential for only a small portion of the formation, and Mark Papa was cautious about committing too much investment there.
“We made a tactical mistake in retrospect,” he says now. “We weren’t sure what we had . . . We could have owned the Bakken play, literally, at that time.” Instead of tying up drilling rights to all the acreage in the Bakken, EOG signed up about a fifth of it, leaving plenty of room for its competitors.
Late in 2008, Brigham experimented with a Bakken well called Brad Olson 10-15 #1H. The plan was to drill a long horizontal well, running sideways for about 10,000 feet, and frack it in 20 stages, allowing the force to be applied more precisely.
“At the time there were a lot of people saying, ‘You can’t do that,’” says Russell Rankin, who worked for Brigham then. “There were a lot of firsts. It had never been done, so there’s a lot of naysayers that say you can’t do it.”
The naysayers were wrong. Other wells in the area produced about 240 barrels per day when they started up. The Olson well had initial production of more than 1,400 b/d. Brigham’s later wells did even better. “We not only proved that the technology could be done but we also did it in an area where they didn’t think the rock was good enough,” Rankin says.
EOG’s Parshall well could have been an anomaly. Brigham’s Olson well showed there were large areas of the Bakken that could be made to produce oil at commercially attractive rates. “The economic acreage dramatically expanded with that one well,” Rankin says. “When this well was drilled and completed, people’s minds started opening up.”
Innovations are hard to protect in the oil business, and Brigham’s success was quickly emulated. Companies with drilling rights in the Bakken, including Continental Resources, Hess and Whiting Petroleum as well as EOG, began to pour money into the area, drilling their own horizontal wells with multi-stage fracks. The number of drilling rigs in North Dakota doubled from May to December 2009, from 35 to 75, and then doubled again to 173 by the end of 2010. The sleepy rural town of Williston, residents say, “went crazy”.

Boomtown, USA

Oil companies and the businesses that support them were desperate for workers, and people flocked to North Dakota from all over the country to meet that need. “It was insane,” says Cindy Sanford, manager of the Williston job service. The town grew from 14,787 residents at the 2010 census to an estimated “service population” of about 32,000.
Thousands were put up in “man camps”: clusters of prefabricated huts where workers would sleep and eat while working 12-hour days for two solid weeks, returning to their homes across the country for two-week breaks.
Others turned up on spec without a job or anywhere to live. An NBC Nightly Newssegment in October 2011, describing Williston as “where the jobs are”, at a time when the US recovery was slow and the national unemployment rate was 8.8 per cent, drew a flood of hopeful newcomers.
“People would walk in here and say, ‘I just came in from Florida,’” Sanford says. “They were sleeping in their cars because there was no housing.”
The roads were jammed with trucks and Ford pickups. You might have to wait in line for 90 minutes to get your hair cut at Walmart, or for two hours to get a table at one of the town’s handful of restaurants. Rents for single-bedroom homes were the highest in the country, according to a survey for Apartment Guide last year, at $2,394 per month; more than in the metropolitan areas of New York or San Francisco.
Businesses catering to the predominantly male oilfield workforce, including bars, strip clubs and tattoo parlours, did roaring trade. Boomtown Babes, a bright pink hut in a hotel car park, opened with women in vests selling “the Bakken’s breast coffee”, charging more than $7 for a large double-shot latte.
The crime rate, which had been well below the US average, rose sharply. There were 1,328 felony arrests in Williston last year, more than twice as many as in 2013.
Williston’s infrastructure scrambled to keep up. There are new and half-built homes all around the city and plans for a $500m mall development, expansion of the water treatment system and a new airport.
Shale oil has transformed US energy security and rattled leaders of rival oil countries from Riyadh to Caracas
“We’re playing SimCity in real life,” says Jeff Zarling of Dawa Solutions, a local web design and marketing firm. “We had to build everything.”
The sign as you come into Williston still says “Boomtown, USA” but the town is not really booming any longer. The streets are quieter now and the wait for a haircut is shorter. A couple of the man camps on the outskirts of town are closing.
The number of rigs drilling for oil in the Williston Basin has slumped from 190 at the end of November to just 89 at the beginning of April. With each rig supporting about 120 jobs, that is about 12,000 jobs gone from the region in the past five months. Reported unemployment in the county is still only 1.9 per cent — low by any standard — but the days of just turning up and having a choice of jobs are gone.
“We used to say if you walk in through the door, there’s four jobs for you,” says Cindy Sanford. “Now there’s maybe a job and a half.”
The neon adverts around Williston for petrol at $2.49 per gallon, about a third less than it cost last summer, are constant reminders of the reason for that. The Bakken and other centres of the US oil boom have suffered the same fate that Mark Papa foresaw for the gas industry: they have been too successful for their own good.

The oil price collapse

Between 2010 and 2015, US oil production grew in a way that has few parallels in the history of the industry. In 2009 it averaged 5.4 million barrels of crude per day. Last month, it was 9.4 million, approaching the all-time high of a little over 10 million reached in 1970.
Rents for single-bedroom homes in Williston last year were the highest in the country, at $2,394 per month — more than in New York or San Francisco
Mark Papa had believed that oil was less at risk of becoming oversupplied because, unlike gas, it is sold in an integrated global market. The US does not export much crude oil but it exports a lot of refined products such as diesel fuel, and rising crude production has displaced imports from Africa and the Middle East. From 2011 to the summer of 2014, the steady flow of additional oil from the US was offset in world markets by disruptions to supplies from other countries, including Libya’s civil war and the sanctions imposed on Iran because of its nuclear programme. Even as US output soared, world oil prices remained remarkably steady at about $100-$110 per barrel.
Last summer, though, the balance in the market began to shift. US production was roaring ahead even faster than expected, as oil companies discovered new techniques to boost their output. At the same time, global demand growth was faltering, partly because of the slowdown in China.
The conditions were right for a conflagration in oil markets. When Saudi Arabia signalled that it would not cut its production to support prices, it lit a match. The kingdom, which is the most influential member of Opec, the producing countries’ cartel, had been hinting since October that it would not support production cuts. Right up until the Opec meeting in Vienna on November 27, though, there were many who still hoped the Saudis would spring a surprise and back a cut after all. When that did not happen, the price of oil collapsed. Much of US shale production, which typically has higher costs than oil in the Middle East, became unprofitable.
Production from shale wells declines very quickly, so companies need to keep drilling just to keep their output level. The plunging numbers of active rigs have already been reflected in small falls in oil production in the Bakken and the Eagle Ford shale. If the rig counts stay at these levels or fall further, it is likely that US production will drop, too.
Harold Hamm, the son of an Oklahoma sharecropper who is now the billionaire majority owner of Continental Resources, one of the pioneers of the Bakken, says Saudi Arabia has been engaged in “predatory pricing”, aimed at the US industry.
“They realised that this was a big threat. The development of these shales is a threat to their market share,” he says. “So they are using predatory pricing to try to drag us down, to take the price down and kill this industry. And they’re doing a pretty good job of it. In 120 days they’ve laid down over half the rigs drilling for oil in this country.”
. . .
Like many in Williston, Rich Vestal takes a close interest in Opec. But he thinks its power is waning. “The American dream is to be self-sufficient,” he says, and in oil he thinks that point is getting closer, regardless of the latest downturn in the US industry. He came to Williston in the last oil boom, in the late 1970s, working for a company that went bust because it had overextended. With the customers and staff he had built up, and a $15,000 loan that he told the bank was for home improvements, he started his own company, Red River Oilfield Services, which has now been in business for 37 years. A large part of its business is in supplying chemicals for the “mud” used in drilling wells, so its fortunes are directly tied to the number of rigs in the area.
Oil companies are under pressure to cut their costs and strengthen profitability, and that gets passed on to their suppliers. Some have told Red River they want 40 per cent cuts in rates.
“It is tough,” says Curtis Shuck, Red River’s vice-president of business development. “Suppliers are out of flesh to cut and they are getting down to the bone. It’s pretty damn painful.” A year ago the company had about 120 employees; today it is down to 80.
Financially weaker countries that rely on oil revenues, and have no cushion against price swings, face government dysfunction or even ‘state failure’
But Vestal remembers times that have been just as bad in the past. In 1985, the North Dakota rig count fell from 225 to just two. “We went for 32 days without filling a single delivery,” he says. “It was really ugly.” The industry has been up and down and up before, and he expects it will be up again in time.
Petroleum Services is another Williston oil industry supplier that has been shedding jobs, laying off about 30 people from its workforce of 137 last year. If conditions do not improve, says Mihir Varia, its business analyst, it will have to lose 30 more. It is under huge pressure to cut the rates it charges customers. But Varia says there are limits on how far its rates can go. “If we need another 20 per cent off the selling price, we can’t survive.”
Petroleum Services and companies like it, however, offer part of the solution to the industry’s crisis. Costs tend to be higher in the Bakken than in the US oil boom areas in Texas, in part because North Dakota has not developed an ecosystem of suppliers to support a large-scale industry. When something breaks, the replacement part has often had to be trucked in from Houston or Calgary, at great cost in time and money. Building up a stronger network of local suppliers will be one way to keep costs down.
In rolling grassland about an hour from Williston, the peace is broken by the roar of machinery. Packed into a gravel area a few hundred yards across are 12 large trucks with high-pressure pumps, a row of water tanks, and trailers carrying sand, to frack a group of wells for Statoil, the Norwegian oil company. Statoil bought Brigham Exploration for $4.4bn in 2011, and has since been the most successful foreign operator in US shale.
The workers, masked against the flurries of sand that get whipped up into the air, keep the frack job ticking like a well-regulated machine. There are eight wells on one site, spreading out below the surface, and four are being completed simultaneously. The pumps are connected to a well, and about 200,000 gallons of water are pumped in to frack a single section. Then a plug is put in to seal that well temporarily while a stage is fracked on the next one, and so on, in rotation.
Drilling and completing wells this way can be a much cheaper and more efficient way to operate than making each of them a one-off. Russell Rankin, now a manager of geology at Statoil, says that in 2013-14, a well took them 22 or 23 days to drill and complete. Now it takes just 10 or 11.
In the early days of the shale boom, it was the smaller companies such as EOG and Brigham that innovated. Now, Rankin says, Statoil and other larger companies need to be equally nimble and creative, to drill more wells with each rig, and recover more oil from each well. “You keep pushing that envelope,” Rankin says. “There’s a lot of efficiencies left to gain there.”
New technologies are coming into use all the time: new fracking fluids, better drills, more sensors to deliver data on what is happening down the well, and more computer power to analyse that data to inform decisions about how the next well should be drilled. There are also more straightforward savings to be achieved simply by managing operations better.
During the boom, the industry was “out of control”, says Curtis Shuck of Red River. “When things were going crazy, nobody had time to think about it. You couldn’t help but make money,” he says. “Now we’re doing it right.” There is no “one single silver bullet that’s going to cure the woes of the entire industry,” he adds. “But by everybody digging deep and pulling together, all of a sudden the economics start to make sense.”
There is a consensus in Williston that if oil were to rebound to $70 per barrel for benchmark US crude, compared to $56 last week, the industry would pick up. In effect, that would put a ceiling on oil prices, because as soon as oil becomes expensive enough, there will be more drilling and more supply coming on the market. Harold Hamm of Continental Resources expects oil to recover but thinks the rebound will be limited. “We’ll maybe get $75 or $80,” he says. “But we won’t get the $120-$130 that the Saudis want.”

Global instability

The US oil boom has had profound implications for the rest of the world, boosting economic growth and enhancing America’s global influence. The Prize’s Daniel Yergin, who is vice-chairman of IHS, the research firm, argues it was critical in putting pressure on Iran to negotiate a deal over its nuclear programme. International sanctions that cut Iran’s oil exports were effective because oil markets were reassured that rising US production would provide an alternative source of supply. Without the shale boom, Yergin says, “There would not be a preliminary agreement with Iran, because Iran would not have had to come to the table.”
The boom has helped put pressure on other geopolitical rivals of the US. In Russia, the collapse in the price of oil, its principal export, has added to the problems facing President Vladimir Putin, already squeezed by western sanctions over the undeclared invasion of eastern Ukraine. Low oil prices are an indiscriminate weapon, though: they also hurt US allies including Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Iraq, which has been warning that the strain on its finances is hampering its fight against the Islamic State.
If the international oil price does hit a new ceiling at about $80 per barrel, the countries that need a higher price to balance their budgets will come under growing financial strain.
A weaker oil price is on balance good news for the world economy, adding an expected 0.5 to 1 per cent to global growth this year, according to World Bank estimates. The effect on some of the losers from cheaper oil, however, could be catastrophic. “The shale revolution is the most politically disruptive factor in the global oil market since the formation of Opec in 1960,” says Edward Morse, head of commodity research at Citigroup. Financially weaker countries that rely on their oil revenues, that have not built up large reserves to cushion against price swings, and that cannot readily diversify into other industries, face the threat of government dysfunction or even “state failure”, Morse says. “This is a recipe for global instability.”
Past periods of low or falling oil prices have contributed to political upheavals including the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Soviet Union’s collapse in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and the 1998 election that gave Hugo Chávez the presidency of Venezuela. Consumers enjoying lower fuel prices resulting from the US shale boom should watch out for the turbulence following in its wake.
Oil producers praying for relief from low prices might take heart from the lost jobs and idled rigs in the US. But the American strengths that made the boom — entrepreneurial culture, depth of knowledge in oil and gas, innovation and supportive capital markets — are now being deployed to keep it alive. Recent history suggests it would be rash to bet against them.
“Look how far we’ve come since 2006,” says Russell Rankin of Statoil. “It’s incredible. So for us to think that we’re through with the technology . . . to say that that’s over is kind of idiotic . . . We’ll always come up with a solution.”
Ed Crooks is the FT’s US industry and energy editor
. . .

The fracking controversy

In many parts of the US and Europe, “fracking” has become a dirty word. New York State, Scotland, France and Bulgaria are among the regions and countries that have introduced bans on fracking that prevent the development of their shale oil and gas resources. In other places, including England and California, the use of fracking is fiercely contested.
In common usage, the word has come to represent not just the specific technique of hydraulic fracturing but the general practice of oil and gas production; a conflation that often fosters confusion in debates between the industry and the public. Concerns about “fracking”, in its broader sense, include the potential for air and water pollution and the risk of small earthquakes, particularly from wells used to dispose of waste water. Environmentalists worried about the threat of climate change also object to the lower cost and increased availability of fossil fuels made possible by fracking.
In North Dakota and Texas, the two centres of the US oil boom, however, the opposition to fracking has a much lower profile, reflecting the industry’s importance to those states’ economies. Concerns about pollution do occasionally crop up but the bigger worries are generally about congestion on the roads and the strain on local infrastructure.

Thursday, May 7, 2015

Indonesia: No more Mr nice guy - Financial Times

May 4, 2015 at 9:07pm
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May 3, 2015 8:15 pm

Indonesia: No more Mr nice guy

David Pilling and Ben Bland
Months into his presidency, critics say Widodo is using executions to look like a strong leader
Known domestically as a reformer with a winning smile and a common touch, it is ironic that internationally Joko Widodo is gaining a reputation as Indonesia’s executioner-in-chief. The new president, elected on a tide of hope last July, has refused to blink in the face of pressure to stop a spate of executions of convicted drug smugglers, most of them foreign.Just past midnight on Wednesday, eight prisoners, from Australia, Brazil and Nigeria, along with one from Indonesia, were taken to a field on the island of Nusa Kambangan off the southern coast of Java and shot by firing squad. Recalling his ambassador to Jakarta, Tony Abbott, Australia’s prime minister, called the executions “cruel and unnecessary”. Although the two Australian prisoners had admitted being part of a group caught smuggling 18.5 pounds of heroin out of Bali in 2005, advocates asking for clemency said they had shown remorse.

Mr Widodo, 53, has been resolute, saying foreigners should not interfere in Indonesia’s judicial system. “Indonesia is in a drug emergency,” he said recently, using figures, questioned by some analysts, suggesting there are more than 4m drug users among the country’s 250m population. “We are not going to compromise for drug dealers,” he said. Last week’s executions were not the first of his presidency. In January, five foreign drug convicts and one Indonesian were shot. Dozens more sit on death row.
The president’s grim resolve has played well in the majority-Muslim country, where there is little sympathy for drug smugglers and even less for foreign governments perceived as seeking special favours. For Mr Widodo, though, his sudden conversion to the merits of the death penalty — a topic he barely raised during the election — smacks as much of desperation as strength.
“He is trying to look like a strong leader and believes this will appeal to his base,” says Jonathan Pincus, president of the Rajawali Foundation, a think-tank. Indonesia’s president, he says, might be trying to “undo a little of the damage” he suffered after a recent high-profile tussle over an appointment that, to many Indonesians, has sullied Mr Widodo’s reformist credentials.

Proof of progress?

His tough stance is a long way from the homespun charm that endeared him to many Indonesians and propelled him, against all odds, to the presidency. That has put Mr Widodo, a former furniture salesman and small-town mayor, in charge of the world’s fourth most populous nation with an economy roughly the same size as Britain’s.
When he came to office — the first leader since independence from outside the political and military elite — there was enormous hope he could stamp out corruption, knock the bureaucracy into shape and drive through economic change. To many ordinary Indonesians, Mr Widodo was “one of them” and his rise to power proof of how much the country had progressed since its transition from dictatorship in the late 1990s. Yet even some of his strongest advocates concede that he is struggling.
Rather than a crafty politician able to outwit his foes, his detractors see him as a country bumpkin being manipulated by the elite, says Paul Rowland, a consultant in Jakarta. “You’ve got the Clampetts in charge of the palace,” is how he puts such disdain, referring to the Beverley Hillbillies, a US television comedy.
In an interview with the Financial Times , just before the executions, Mr Widodo firmly denied he was being outmanoeuvred, though he was reluctant to talk about alleged setbacks. “This is the Financial Times, not the Political Times,” he parried. His smile temporarily extinguished, he ventured: “In politics, sometimes we must compromise.”
©EPAThree of the executed death row prisoners
His political troubles began in January when he nominated Budi Gunawan, a three-star general, to lead the police force. That was widely seen as a sop to Megawati Sukarnoputri, a former president and leader of the Indonesian Democratic Party-Struggle (PDI-P), of which Mr Widodo is a member. Mr Gunawan was regarded by many as an old-style political appointment, not the sort of clean technocrat Mr Widodo had promised. That impression only intensified when the Corruption Eradication Commission named Mr Gunawan as a suspect in an investigation. He vigorously denied the allegations and his suspect status was overturned by another court before he was made deputy police chief.
As a turf war erupted between the police force and the thinly staffed anti-graft commission, some of Mr Widodo’s supporters were shocked as he stood on the sidelines.

Sukarnoputri’s attack

That has not been the only blemish. Many of Mr Widodo’s cabinet appointments bear the imprint of Mrs Sukarnoputri, the daughter of Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president. Mrs Sukarnoputri’s own daughter was appointed a senior minister, one of several cabinet selections that reflect her influence. To make things worse, in April Mrs Sukarnoputri launched an attack on Mr Widodo. Though she did not name him, she said the constitution obliged presidents to do the bidding of their party and warned against “traitors who have repeatedly stabbed her in the back”.
Such setbacks appear to be damaging his popularity. One poll in February showed his support at 42 per cent against 72 per cent in August. Political ructions could also limit the investment that Mr Widodo is keen to encourage. “Businesses need to know that politics will be stable if they are to invest,” says Rusdi Kirana, owner of Lion Air, Indonesia’s biggest airline and a member of the president’s business advisory group.
Eri Suriamuldana, a 45-year-old who runs a welding business in Jakarta, is also dissatisfied. The president has yet to make good on his election pledges such as a plan to extend credit to small entrepreneurs, he says. “He’s not brave enough . . . I’m not very optimistic about the future if he’s still running the government under the shadow of his political party.”
In the interview, Mr Widodo sought to assure that he was craftier than he appeared. He points to the swift passage of his first budget, which diverted more than $20bn from fuel subsidies to infrastructure, health and education. “We got 100 per cent approval,” he says. “I don’t have a problem with parliament.”
The president laughed off his public dressing down by Mrs Sukarnoputri. He has been busy winning support from the opposition parties that supported his defeated presidential rival, Prabowo Subianto. Leading members of three of the parties that backed Mr Subianto now say they want to join Mr Widodo’s governing coalition.
“A lot of people underestimate him,” says Hikmahanto Juwana, a professor of law at the University of Indonesia. “Sometimes in Indonesian politics you have to play nice in public,” referring to Mr Widodo’s habit of compromising with his enemies.
The fallout from such struggles will help determine how successful Mr Widodo will be in implementing his economic plans. He is clear that changes are vital. That is not only because the country’s potential has long been sapped by corruption and a lack of infrastructure. The World Bank estimated that logistics costs amounted to 27 per cent of gross domestic product in Indonesia in 2013, compared with just 13 per cent in Malaysia and 8 per cent in Singapore.
In addition, Indonesia’s economy is now growing at the slowest pace in five years, as falling demand from China has hit exports of coal, palm oil and rubber. After growing for many years at or near 6 per cent and peaking at 6.5 per cent in 2012, GDP expanded by just 5 per cent last year.
Mr Widodo says Indonesia must find alternative engines of growth now that the days of high commodity prices — which represent more than half of its exports — are over. Domestic consumption, which accounts for about 60 per cent of output, has also shown recent signs of weakness, with sales of cars and motorbikes falling.

Economic focus

As the US interest-rate cycle turns and the rupiah weakens, Indonesia remains vulnerable to a repeat of the “taper tantrum” sell-off of 2013, when investors rushed out of emerging markets reliant on foreign financing. With international investors owning nearly 40 per cent of Indonesia’s government bonds, even small reversals in sentiment could have an outsized impact on Southeast Asia’s biggest economy.
Mr Widodo professes not to be worried. Instead, he says, he will seize on current difficulties as an opportunity to remake the economy. He has already scrapped most fuel subsidies. He wants to shift the economy from what he sees as an over-reliance on consumption towards production and investment. In this light, a weak rupiah, if it helped make manufacturing more competitive, could be a boon, he says.
Another huge challenge is the infrastructure bottleneck. Advisers say that, rather than theorising about policy, Mr Widodo will seek to clear the path for specific projects, such as the $4bn Japanese-backed Batang power station in electricity-starved central Java. He has promised to install 35GW of new power plants in the next five years, increasing the country’s capacity by 80 per cent.
“Investors always complain about our infrastructure, our power plants, our business permit system and the land acquisition process,” he says. “Now I’m concentrating on this.”
Analysts are sceptical about whether such solutions can work in practice — or in time to offset possible outflows of hot money. There is no evidence of outflows yet, but there are fears of what will happen when US rates rise.
“As a mayor, Mr Widodo used to text his people to fix a pothole,” says Mr Rowland. “But you can’t do that when you have 34 ministers.”
The manpower ministry recently floated the idea — eventually blocked when it reached the president’s desk — of requiring foreign workers in the country to pass an exam in the Indonesian language. And the government has said it wants Pertamina, the state-owned oil and gas company, to take over Indonesia’s largest gasfield from Total when the contract expires in 2017.
To his critics, these incidents show that Mr Widodo lacks a grand strategy and proper control over his cabinet. The president seems to believe he can charm his way out of such problems. Addressing foreign investors at a recent World Economic Forum meeting in Jakarta, he asked them to “join me and my people on an incredible journey . . . and to make incredible profits”. To much laughter, he added: “And if you have any problems, call me.”
Foreign investors want him to deliver. When pushed, Mr Widodo offers a non-committal “time will tell”, though barring a political earthquake he has at least four-and-a-half more years to make good on his promises.
Many Indonesians are keeping the faith. “Everything still probably looks like business as usual because the president just started,” says Dani, who works at Jakarta’s Sunda Kelapa port. “But I’m still optimistic he will make a change in the future — because he’s a good guy.”

Making enemies: a foreign policy designed to pay dividends

Mr Widodo’s resolve to push ahead with the executions of mostly foreign drug convicts despite international condemnation is indicative of how he has shifted Indonesia’s foreign policy since becoming president.
His predecessor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, promoted a policy of “a thousand friends and zero enemies” designed to mollify critics and avoid tough issues. Mr Yudhoyono was keen to win international approval and placed an unofficial moratorium on capital punishment, helping to underline his credentials as a conciliator and win him several international awards.
But Mr Widodo has taken a more transactional view of foreign policy, centred around three goals: upholding sovereignty, protecting citizens abroad and promoting trade and investment.
“Many friends should bring many benefits,” he said after his first overseas trip in November. The implication is that he is much more willing than Mr Yudhoyono to upset other nations if it means promoting Indonesia’s core interests.
Mr Widodo’s advisers are focusing their investment promotion efforts on China, Japan and South Korea, which are all keen to deepen their footprint in Southeast Asia.
Tom Lembong, a private equity investor who advises Mr Widodo on economic policy, believes that despite the blowback of the executions, the president’s focus on attracting international investment will pay dividends. “The president is in showcase mode, trying to get capital in and demonstrate his abilities through concrete achievements in the field,” he says.

Wednesday, May 6, 2015

No debt talks until Greece agrees reforms, warns Moscovici - Financial Times

May 5, 2015 at 11:20pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/416df9f6-f318-11e4-b98f-00144feab7de.html?ftcamp=published_links%2Frss%2Fworld%2Ffeed%2F%2Fproduct#axzz3ZA6FwqUM



May 5, 2015 1:07 pm

No debt talks until Greece agrees reforms, warns Moscovici

Peter Spiegel in Brussels and Stefan Wagstyl in Berlin
An Anti-IMF sign outside the University of Athens
Greece’s eurozone creditors will not discuss how to get the country’s sovereign debt back on a sustainable path until Athens agrees to a new economic reform programme that would release €7.2bn in desperately needed bailout funds, the EU’s economic chief said on Tuesday. 
The talks over the reform programme, which have intensified in recent days, are at the centre of a three-month stalemate between eurozone creditors and the new radical leftist Greek government. The Syriza administration in Athens has resisted many of the reforms in the existing bailout programme but needs the funding to fill its rapidly dwindling coffers.



Pierre Moscovici, the European commissioner for economic affairs, said debt issues “can only be discussed after we have agreed a reform programme. His statement reflects ongoing resistance in eurozone capitals to any form of “haircut” on Greek sovereign debt, which is now mostly held by EU governments and institutions.
Mr Moscovici’s comments come as the International Monetary Fund has suggested eurozone creditors may need to write down some of their Greek bailout loans to ensure the country’s debt levels begin to decline more sharply. 
Officials involved in the talks said the IMF was not seeking large-scale debt relief immediately. Instead, it was warning that any concessions to Athens that allowed the government to post lower budget surpluses — the likely trajectory of the current talks — would require debt relief to make up the difference.
“Six months ago, we all concluded there was no need for debt relief,” said one senior official. “But if there’s a significant relaxation of the programme [targets], the IMF will want to see some debt relief.”
Without a return to sustainable debt levels — or a larger bailout from the eurozone to ensure Athens can continue to pay its bills — the IMF may be forced under its rules to withhold its share of the current bailout tranche, which amounts to about half of the €7.2bn being negotiated. 
Wolfgang Schäuble, the German finance minister, has acknowledged that Poul Thomsen, head of the IMF’s European department, raised the issue of Greece’s mounting debt pile with his fellow eurozone finance ministers during a contentious meeting last month in Riga. Other officials said Mr Thomsen specifically mentioned the possibility of debt relief during the closed-door session.
Mr Schäuble said that before the recent political turmoil in Athens — triggered in December when the previous government failed to get its presidential candidate chosen, forcing parliamentary elections — Greece was moving “more quickly” than planned to reach the bailout programme’s debt targets. Since January’s parliamentary elections, reaching such targets had become “more difficult”, he added. 
Under a November 2012 agreement between Athens and its international creditors, Greece is scheduled to cut its debt levels to 120 per cent of gross domestic product by 2020 and “substantially lower” than 110 per cent by 2022. Debt relief was agreed as a possible way to reach the targets if Greece was able to run a primary budget surplus.
The European Commission’s new economic forecasts, unveiled by Mr Moscovici on Tuesday, showed Greece’s debt levels were rising again amid the renewed financial turmoil.
In February, Brussels forecast Greek debt would fall from 176.2 per cent of GDP in 2014 to 170.2 per cent this year; the new forecasts predict it will rise to 180.2 per cent this year.