Saturday, May 16, 2015

4 Myths That Keep You From Living Fully and Fearlessly - Huff Post


Anita Moorjani Become a fan Speaker and bestselling author of 'Dying to Be Me'
  • 4 Myths That Keep You From Living Fully and Fearlessly
Posted: 10/07/2014 8:12 am EDT Updated: 10/07/2014 8:59 am EDT



One of the biggest lessons I learned from nearly dying of cancer is the importance of loving myself unconditionally. In fact, learning to love and accept myself unconditionally is what healed me and brought me back from the brink of death. During my workshops and speeches, I often tell the audience to "Love yourself like your life depends on it, because it does!"
Being at the brink of death taught me that my purpose in life is to be who I am, and express my authentic self fearlessly. But I also learned that I would never fully express myself unless I was able to accept and love myself unconditionally. The extent to which I am fearless about expressing my authentic self is in direct correlation with how much I love and accept myself.
If you're anything like me, you will feel that it's one thing to know the importance of loving ourselves in theory, but quite another thing to effectively put self-love into practice. Most of us come from cultures and societies that do not promote, or even support, self-love, and we often feel judged if we love ourselves, value ourselves, or put ourselves first.
It almost feels as though we live in an upside-down world where we are taught the opposite of what would really help us in life, and when we actually stumble upon the truth of how to live our lives joyfully, we are judged for practicing it.
Perhaps this is the reason why so many of us are struggling through life -- we are brought up to believe in the opposite of what would really help us, and when we inadvertently stumble upon the truth of how to live our lives joyfully, we are judged for practicing it.
Below, I've listed some common myths which people seem to take as truths, and which I believe hold us back from living our life fully:
Myth #1: It's selfish to love yourself: To dispel this myth, just look at its opposite: what does it look like if we don't love or value ourselves? We feel unworthy, undeserving, and unlovable, and the person we become is one who is needy with a void that we believe needs to be filled by others because we believe that it's selfish to fill it ourselves.
This is the person I used to be. I was needy -- and a people pleaser -- because I needed the validation of others in order to feel worthy. Now, I've noticed that when we love ourselves, we don't need the approval of others in order to be who we are. Instead, we are able to bring our fully-realized, joyful self out into the world -- someone who others want to be around -- instead of a self that is needy, with a hole that needs to be filled from the outside.
Myth #2: Loving myself means needing constant self-care, which could make me high maintenance: Many have expressed to me that they believe loving and honoring ourselves simply means making the time in our busy schedules to take care of ourselves -- for example, taking the time to meditate, smell the flowers, get a manicure, get our hair done, or get a massage -- basically, spend money on ourselves and give ourselves a treat. People tell me "I must already really love myself, because I do that type of stuff for myself all the time. But my life still doesn't work!"
Although I do think it's important to take the time to do those things for ourselves if it brings us pleasure, here's what self-love means to me: It means loving myself even when I fail. Even when I'm feeling down, and feel as though I have nothing left. Even when I feel that everyone on the planet is against me and doesn't understand me. I need to be able to look myself in the eyes, and say, "No matter what anyone else thinks, I will not let myself down, or forsake myself. I will stay by my own side!"
Myth #3: Loving ourselves means being in denial of our weaknesses Many believe that loving ourselves means being in denial about our seeming failures, and just talking ourselves with affirmations. However, this isn't the case. It's not just about constantly praising ourselves, talking ourselves up and telling ourselves how awesome we are. It's about loving the REAL us! It's about loving the human "us." The "us" who has feet of clay, the "us" who comes undone under criticism, the "us" who sometimes fails and disappoints those around us. It's about making a commitment to ourselves that we will stick by "us," even if no one else does! That's what loving ourselves means!
Myth #4: It's important to always stay positive, regardless of external circumstances: Although it's not a bad thing to have a positive attitude in life, I have found that as someone who reads books that advocate positive thinking, and how our thoughts create our reality, I started to become fearful of having "negative" thoughts. Whenever I had a fearful or insecure or negative thought, I would deny it, suppress it, and push it away, believing that it would contribute towards manifesting into a negative physical reality. It was only after almost dying of cancer, did I realize that I had been suppressing many of my thoughts and emotions, for fear of being negative, and putting "negative thoughts" out there. And this suppression only contributed to my illness. I then realized that it's not my thoughts that create my reality; it's my emotions towards myself. That is, the more I love myself, the better my external world. The more I love and value myself, the more I allow positive things to come into my life. The less I love myself, the less I feel worthy of allowing positive things to come into my life.
If I constantly suppress certain emotions and feelings within myself, judging them as being "negative" and forcing myself to have more positive thoughts, the message I am sending to my own self is that "my thoughts are wrong. I should not be having these thoughts!" Basically, I am denying who I am, and what I am feeling. This is not a loving thing to do to myself, and neither is it healthy to have all these feelings and emotions bottled up inside. I have since realized that it's more important to be myself than it is to be positive. And as a result, when I am positive, it is genuine and authentic.

Friday, May 15, 2015

Macau overtakes Switzerland in income tables - Financial Times

May 14, 2015 at 1:27pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/df9039ec-01aa-11e4-bb71-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=intl#axzz3a4x7cWmS

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July 2, 2014 8:09 am

Macau overtakes Switzerland in income tables

By Demetri Sevastopulo in Hong Kong

Macau has leapfrogged Switzerland to become the world’s fourth richest territory per person, according to the World Bank, thanks to the influx of mainland Chinese gamblers and tourists.
The former Portuguese colony recorded per capita gross domestic product of $91,376 in 2013, behind Luxembourg, Norway and Qatar. The Chinese territory overtook Switzerland – where on average each person earned $80,528 – with an 18.4 per cent jump that was driven by buoyant gaming revenues.


Since Macau was returned to China in 1999, its economy has grown 557 per cent as the territory of 607,000 people has been transformed into a gambling mecca. 
The most dramatic expansion has come since the Chinese territory scrapped a monopoly gaming concession in 2002 and awarded casino licences to six operators that include Sheldon Adelson’s Sand’s ChinaWynn Macau and Stanley Ho’s SJM
In 2013, Macau posted gaming revenues of $45bn – more than seven times Las Vegas – continuing a dizzying rise that has pushed unemployment down to 1.7 per cent. The bulk of the money comes from mainland Chinese punters visiting Macau, the only place in China where casinos are legal.
The local population has benefited from the casino growth through the number of jobs created, although residents are worried about the impact on housing prices and rents. The government has tried to spread the wealth generated by gambling by providing residents with annual subsidies. In 2014, it will provide permanent residents with a handout of about $1,200.
Analysts expect Macau to continue to grow strongly, especially as casino operators open hotel and gaming properties in the developing Cotai Strip area. CLSA, one of the most bullish brokerages on Macau, reckons revenues will reach $90bn by 2018, as more mainland Chinese travel to the territory, partly helped by high-speed rail and other transport links. 
Macau will also gain from the expected 2017 opening of the world’s longest bridge that will provide a 30-minute road link from Hong Kong airport, which has more capacity than Macau’s own airport.
But some signs have emerged in recent months that growth is easing. In June, Macau saw its first year-on-year decline in gaming revenues since 2009, in a fall that analysts attributed to punters diverting money to the World Cup. But casinos have also been hit by the slowdown in the Chinese economy in addition to austerity and anti-corruption campaigns by Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Speaking recently in Macau, Steve Wynn, chairman and chief executive of Wynn Macau, said Mr Xi’s campaigns had barely had an impact, but added that luxury retail sales were “off by a small amount”.
“I am sure the new president of China is going to make a very important impact on China as he goes forward, but right here in Macau, things seem the same to us,” said Mr Wynn. 
Casino stocks in Macau have also been hit by reports that the territory is clamping down on the use of Unionpay credit cards – China’s biggest credit card operator – to try to curb efforts to circumvent currency controls.
I am sure the new president of China is going to make a very important impact on China as he goes forward, but right here in Macau, things seem the same to us- Steve Wynn
Mr Wynn rejected suggestions that Chinese government concerns about money flowing out of China might hurt casinos in Macau, which ultimately requires approval from Beijing for expansion.
“There is freedom here and the people who are successful in China will travel, shop and spend their money as they fit, within certain reasons, within certain guidelines,” said Mr Wynn. “I don’t see any major change in that . . . As far as wealthy folks in China, just like they always have, they get to do what they want. And if that’s not true then that’s the first time in history that’s not true.”
The rise of Macau as a gaming haven has also spawned sports and entertainment tourism. Over the past year, the territory has hosted musicians such as the Rolling Stones and sports stars such as David Beckham and Tiger Woods. 
In 2012, Macau was sixth in the World Bank rankings, behind Bermuda and Switzerland. The 2013 data did not include a figure for Bermuda, but based on its 2012 GDP per capita figure of $84,471, it will probably trail Macau when the data becomes available. The World Bank has also not yet received estimates for Monaco and Liechtenstein for 2012 or 2013, but based on the latest available figures the two would almost certainly top the rankings, pushing Macau and Switzerland down in the table.
Twitter: @AsiaNewsDemetri

Wednesday, May 13, 2015

Facing up to Franco: Spain 40 years on - Financial Times

May 10, 2015 at 10:56pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/5e4e6aac-f42f-11e4-99de-00144feab7de.html#slide0

Tobias Buck
The country is still coming to terms with the dictator’s legacy. Is it any closer to reaching an agreement about its bloody past?

Fifty kilometres north of Madrid, in the granite mountains of the Sierra de Guadarrama, is the tallest stone cross built anywhere in the world. More than 150 metres high, it stands guard over a vast basilica hewn into the rock below.The sprawling architectural ensemble, coldly symmetrical and entirely grey, shows occasional traces of life. It is home to a Benedictine abbey, along with a religious boarding school and hospice. There is a decent restaurant that specialises in traditional Spanish fare, and a mud-covered football pitch that comes to life whenever the pupils emerge to play a match.

Mostly, however, this is a place of death. Known as the Valle de los Caídos, or Valley of the Fallen, it is the final resting place for more than 33,000 bodies. With one notable exception, all of them were killed during the Spanish civil war, which lasted from 1936 to 1939. The odd one out is the man who started the bloody slaughter, and emerged from it victorious. His grave can be found right behind the high altar, at the very end of the imposing, windowless basilica: a modest granite slab, perpetually adorned with a bouquet of fresh flowers and the simplest of inscriptions: Francisco Franco.
The Spanish dictator died four decades ago this year but his resting place, much like his legacy, is far from settled. Outside Spain, Franco is often situated alongside Hitler and Mussolini as one of the continent’s most reviled fascist leaders, a brutal dictator who plunged his country into war and went on to preside over the death, incarceration, torture and exile of hundreds of thousands of his opponents.
In Spain, however, the government continues to pay for the upkeep of the Valle de los Caídos, tombstone and all, which forms part of the National Heritage. Hundreds of thousands come to visit the site every year. Spain’s Roman Catholic Church, meanwhile, jealously guards its role as the custodian of the Valley, and provides the monks and priests who sanctify the vast granite complex with their daily songs and prayers.

Even 40 years after Franco’s death, there is no national consensus on what the civil war and his dictatorship mean. Only a tiny minority voice genuine nostalgia for the old regime but the number of those clamouring for a frank reassessment of the past — and for expelling Franco from his privileged tomb — is not large either. As a topic of conversation, the former dictator and his deeds are widely shunned, whether in school, in parliament or around the family table. Polls are few and far between but those that are taken regularly show a lingering sense of ambivalence, perhaps linked to the extraordinary economic boom that occurred under the later years of the Franco regime. One typical survey found that six out of 10 Spaniards believe that Francoism had “both good sides and bad sides”.
But it is not just in the Valley that Franco continues to have his place. Despite a purge during the past decade, many Spanish cities still boast streets and plazas that honour his memory. Even the odd statue has survived. There is a prominent foundation dedicated to celebrating the dictator’s life and work. Once a year its members and other Franco sympathisers come to the Valle de los Caídos for a special mass, and to pray for his eternal soul.
To some Spaniards, the site — and the annual ritual — is an abomination, a stain on the country’s democratic record. They argue that Spain, perhaps uniquely in western Europe, has never made an effort to openly confront its past. Far from allowing old wounds to heal, this failure has, in fact, kept old divisions alive for longer than anyone thought possible — the original sin of Spanish democracy, still unatoned after all these years.
One man who believes this more strongly than most is Emilio Silva, a burly political scientist and journalist who rose to prominence over the past decade as the co-founder of Spain’s historical memory movement. “Can you imagine a church in Germany where the priest prays for the soul of Hitler? Can you imagine a square in Italy that is named after Mussolini?,” asks Silva, over coffee in a noisy bar in Madrid.
The movement he started some 15 years ago is best known for locating and digging up the graves of Spanish Republicans killed by Franco’s Nationalists. More than 1,300 bodies have been recovered from roadside ditches and secluded forests, and accorded a proper burial. For the relatives, the process has often been momentous — allowing them finally to come to terms with six decades of pain and grief.
The broader aim of Silva and his allies, however, is to shatter Spain’s so-called pact of forgetting — the unspoken agreement between left and right in the wake of Franco’s death to look to the future, not the past. In legal terms, that pact is cemented in the 1977 amnesty law, which shields former Franco officials — including the regime’s most notorious torturers — from criminal prosecution. Yet it is also reflected in Spain’s schools, where the history of the civil war and Franco’s dictatorship remain marginal subjects. And it finds an echo in the singular absence of any national museum or monument (aside from the Valley) to commemorate the war. “We are a country full of ignorance,” says Silva. “If there wasn’t so much ignorance, Franco would no longer be there [in the basilica]. For a society with even a little bit of understanding, it would simply be intolerable.”
To its defenders, the Valle de los Caídos is, above all else, a site of mourning and reconciliation. They point out that the mass tombs that line those heavy granite walls hold the dead of both sides. But they often fail to mention that the Republican dead were brought to the mausoleum without consulting their families (and that they are held in some cases against the express wishes of relatives). Neither do they question why any Republican would wish to lie buried in a tomb so laden with Francoist and fascist imagery.
At least once a year, the notion of reconciliation becomes impossible to maintain: on November 20, the anniversary of Franco’s death, his supporters arrive from all over the country (and beyond) for a special mass.
I have rarely had cause to attend Catholic mass during my life but even regular worshippers are likely to leave this particular ceremony in a state of dazed wonderment. Part of this has to do with sheer sense of drama.

At the precise moment of the transubstantiation, when the bread and wine are symbolically converted into the body and blood of Christ, the vast underground basilica is plunged into darkness. An invisible helper turns off all lights save for a single spot that is directed at the body of Christ on the cross, along with the hands of the priest holding aloft the wafer.
The priest, who is also the abbot of the Valley’s Benedictine monastery, then starts his homily with a prayer for the soul of Francisco Franco and José Antonio Primo de Rivera, the founder of Spain’s fascist Falange movement. Both men died on November 20 but they are separated by a political eternity: Franco passed away in his bed, peacefully, after 36 years of unopposed rule. Primo de Rivera was killed by a Republican firing squad in 1936, just months after the start of Spain’s civil war.
The two bodies occupy pride of place in the gloomy basilica, buried in front and behind the altar. Standing at the lectern just above, the priest praises the two fascist leaders for their decision to “forgive their enemies and seek their forgiveness for themselves”.
I was told that some worshippers are likely to make a fascist salute but I had not expected arms to be raised quite so brazenly. Some make a discreet, hasty salute on their way to receive Holy Communion; but all inhibitions melt away once the priests, monks and choirboys leave the church. Franco’s grave is quickly surrounded by dozens of admirers. They lay down red flowers and kneel to touch the rough, grey stone. Some offer a personal prayer. Dozens straighten their back and offer the raised-arm salute, while friends and wives snap pictures. Shouts of “Viva Franco!” and “Viva España!” ring out through the vast basilica. Neither the guards from Spain’s National Heritage nor the remaining monk try to intervene.
Standing quietly is Jaime Alonso, the vice-president of the Francisco Franco Foundation and the public face of hardcore Francoists in Spain today. He whispers a prayer and crosses himself but then quickly turns away from the more raucous crowd surrounding the dictator’s grave. Impeccably dressed and softly-spoken, Alonso is a lawyer by profession and Francoist by passion. Armed with a wealth of numbers, dates and facts, he makes a resolute case for Franco’s defence when I catch up with him back in Madrid.
He tells me he grew up with a vision of Franco as the “father of the nation”, and views him still as “the man of providence who came to save Spain”. Selfless, upright, a brilliant military commander and great political strategist, Franco is hailed as a towering figure in Spanish history, comparable only to the medieval rulers who drove the Moors from Spain in 1492 or the great kings who held sway over an empire stretching from Peru to the Philippines.

Alonso vigorously defends Franco’s military putsch against the country’s elected government in 1936, which marked the start of the civil war, as a necessary step to put an end to the chaos and violence of the period. “There was no other option. They could either fight or let themselves be killed,” he insists.
The foundation is located in a third-floor apartment just up the road from Real Madrid’s imposing Bernabéu stadium. The offices are packed with memorabilia, signed photos, oil portraits, thousands of books and an archive. There is even a small souvenir shop, where visitors can pick up a Franco ashtray for €4.50.
For all his enthusiasm, Alonso admits that there are few genuine Francoists in Spain today. Since the return of parliamentary democracy to Spain, there has only been one openly Francoist member of parliament. Even during the recent economic crisis, with millions of Spaniards desperately searching for work, there was no sign of revival in Francoist sentiment.
Yet Alonso is convinced that Franco lives on. Why else, he asks, would the country’s political mainstream be so silent about his rule? “They are afraid of him. They know very well that Franco is more than just a reference, that he is something embedded in the culture of the Spanish people as a solution. Today, even if everything falls apart, we have a national ideal that stays with us and that is passed on in our genes. How can Francoism revive today? As bad as the situation is, the idea is there.”
What is striking is not so much the historical narrative put forward by the Franco Foundation but the absence of any official challenge to it. I have asked dozens of Spaniards what they were taught about the civil war in school. The answer is, almost invariably, nothing. Spain’s parties have never been able to agree on a joint condemnation of the Franco dictatorship, or an official apology to its victims. There has been no official commission and no national museum offering a unified narrative. Even 40 years after the death of Franco, it seems Spaniards find it impossible to reach common ground about their recent history.
For Javier Cercas, the Spanish novelist and writer, the interplay of memory and history, and the stories and lies people tell themselves about the past, have long been a subject of fascination. His 2001 book Soldiers of Salamis is widely hailed as one of the great novels about the civil war. I call him up a few weeks after the release of his latest book, The Imposter, which deals once again with history, war, terror — and the lies they bring forth. The book contains an entire chapter about Spain’s own struggle — and ultimate failure — to come to terms with its history.

“A country must have a basic accord about the past,” Cercas tells me. “Britain has it. Germany has it. All the strong democracies have this basic accord. But Spain hasn’t.” The reason for this, he argues, is obvious: “There was no rupture in Spain after Francoism. There was a transition, there was peaceful and progressive change from dictatorship to democracy. This means that the Spanish right did not break completely with Francoism. It would be wrong and absurd to say that the Spanish right is Francoist. It obviously isn’t. But it has never been able to bring itself to condemn Francoism.”
Not everyone is convinced that this matters. José María de Areilza, a professor of law at Esade business school and former government adviser, speaks for many when he argues that Spain was right to look to the future and “leave the past to the historians”.
“There is no one way to deal with the past,” he tells me. “Franco died in his bed. But everything that has happened in Spain since has condemned him. He is being condemned every day by the normal functioning of our democracy, by our constitution. Spain has moved on by doing, by acting.”
For Cercas, however, the country’s failure to openly confront the past leaves Spain in a state of heightened fragility. “If there is no accord over the past, then the past can always be used, can always be manipulated,” he says. “There is no accord over our past, and that means that finding an accord over our present and our future is much more difficult. Can we live with this? Yes, we can live with this. But would we live better if we had a common narrative? We would live much better.”
The closest that modern Spain ever came to challenging the pact of forgetting was under the Socialist government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, the prime minister from 2004 to 2011. The Zapatero government provided generous funding to unearth Republican war graves, and passed a law calling for the removal of Franco statues and street names.
It faced bitter opposition from the centre-right Popular party, and from Spain’s Roman Catholic Church (which served as a pillar of the Franco regime). At the height of the controversy, the country’s conference of bishops published a searing attack on the government, saying it was “opening old wounds” and “threatening the tranquil co-existence”. The archbishop of Madrid put it even more bluntly. Sometimes, he remarked, “One has to know how to forget.”
Towards the end of its tenure, the Zapatero government finally decided to tackle the biggest totem of them all: the Valley of the Fallen. It appointed a commission of experts and asked it to draw up proposals for an overhaul of the site. The commission was formally established in May 2011 — just six months before a general election that Zapatero knew he would lose. Whatever conclusions its members would reach, they were almost certain to be filed away the very instant that the new centre-right government took over.
Francisco Ferrandiz knew he was part of an exercise in futility but decided to accept the invitation to join the commission all the same. A social anthropologist at Spain’s National Research Council, he had closely followed the work of the historical memory movement. Here was a chance to shape the debate over one of the most contentious monuments in the world today.
In the end, after much internal wrangling, the commission called for a radical overhaul: it suggested removing Franco’s grave from the basilica and burying him elsewhere, and transferring the body of Primo de Rivera from its privileged site to the mass graves that line the church. Just as importantly, they wanted to convert the sections of the site that house the dead into a national cemetery — and so remove it from the oversight of the monks.
As expected, the document was shelved immediately by the new government. Asked about the future of the Valle de los Caídos in 2013, the deputy prime minister fell back on the Popular party’s standard line that any change requires the “consensus” of all parties. That consensus remains as elusive as ever.
For all his frustration, Ferrandiz says he has not lost hope that a new generation of Spaniards will eventually demand a less circumspect relationship between the present and the past. He points out that Spain’s political order is now under scrutiny as never before. The transition itself has become almost a dirty word for a new generation of political activists who are desperate to sweep away what they see as a deeply corrupted system.
Franco is being condemned everyday by the functioning of democracy. Spain has moved on by acting- José María de Areilza, professor of law, Esade business school

“We had the prestigious transition that is being taught all over the world as an example of how to move cleanly from a dictatorship to democracy. Now we find that this transition is under fire because it glossed over some of the thorniest issues of the dictatorship — and let the perpetrators die in bed without ever facing their responsibility. Now we have a new generation saying: ‘We have to face this.’”
That new generation is embodied by Podemos, an anti-establishment party founded only last year and now vying to become one of the largest parties in Spain. Some of its leaders are former activists in the historical memory movement — a background that helps explain the almost visceral rejection of what Podemos leaders refers to as the “transition regime”.
Younger Spaniards are less inclined to fear a return of political instability — or to regard Franco as a totemic issue that must not be raised. For many, the dictator has become a figure of ridicule. “Franco represents everything I don’t like about Spain and about Spanish history — the ultra-right, the relationship between church and state and the whole communion-and-daily-mass way of life,” says Sagrario Monedero, a 33-year-old political activist who works for a women’s rights organisation in Madrid. “But he is also a bit of a comical figure — this small man with a pot belly and a high-pitched voice,” she adds.
Like a growing number of young Spaniards, Monedero has never visited the Valley of the Fallen. She regards the monument as an outrage but also suggests that her generation sees no urgent need to tackle the Franco legacy. “History has already given its verdict.”
It is an argument that goes a long way towards explaining the indifference about Franco in Spain today. But if history has, indeed, made its verdict, why is it not being executed? Why is it so hard for Spanish democracy to touch that brooding mausoleum in the mountains?
“Let’s take this terrible monument as an opportunity,” says Ferrandiz. “It is the biggest Francoist monument of them all, and it is where all the complexities come together. If the debate has to happen somewhere, if we are to find a consensus about our history, it has to be around the Valley.”
Wandering amid the acres of grey granite, it is not easy to share Ferrandiz’s hope that change is in the air. All that heavy stone and polished bronze convey an aura of timeless permanence. Who will have the strength to push aside the massive slab of stone that covers Franco’s grave? What ghosts will awake the day that Spain starts looking unflinchingly into the past, and attempts to finally separate perpetrators from victims?
No one knows. Perhaps the only certainty is contained in the famous line from William Faulkner cited in Cercas’s latest novel, one that could serve as the summary of Spain’s ever-simmering history wars: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”
Tobias Buck is the FT’s Madrid bureau chief

Franco’s life

1892 Francisco Paulino Hermenegildo Teódulo Franco Bahamonde was born on December 4 in Ferrol, a provincial port in northwest Spain.

1907 Like several generations of family before him, he seemed destined for a career in the navy but, instead, joined the Military Academy at Toledo. He graduated as a lieutenant three years later.
1917 He was made the youngest major in the Spanish army after a campaign in Morocco, during which he was severely wounded by a gunshot to his stomach. It is said he would have died if he hadn’t been inhaling when the bullet struck, as this saved his intestines from being hit.
1923 Franco, now leader of the Spanish Legion, married Carmen Polo. They had one daughter, María del Carmen, born in 1926.

1926 He was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. Reputedly, this made him the youngest general in Europe since Napoleon.
1936 In July, civil war broke out in Spain between the leftwing Republicans and the rightwing Nationalists, led by General Franco.
1939 The last Republican forces surrendered in April. Franco declared himself “generalissimo”, head of both state and government.

1939 The second world war began in Europe in September. Franco’s Spain remained officially “neutral” throughout the conflict, even though he had previously received help from Hitler and Mussolini during the Spanish civil war.
1947 Franco reinstated the monarchy but with himself as de facto regent for life.
1950s Spain was brought in from the cold and admitted into the United Nations, and was visited by US President Dwight Eisenhower.
1960s and early 1970s The country enjoyed an economic “Spanish Miracle”, and tourism flourished.
1975 On November 20, Franco died of natural causes. He was buried at Valle de los Caídos.
Research by Spencer Brown

Monday, May 11, 2015

An economic future that may never brighten - Financial Times

May 4, 2015 at 8:27pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/b345d172-e1cd-11e4-bb7f-00144feab7de.html?segid=0200783#axzz3ZA6FwqUM

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April 14, 2015 6:46 pm

An economic future that may never brighten

Martin Wolf
The decline in potential growth leads to debate about the savings glut and secular stagnation
It seems at first to be a puzzling scenario, and you might wonder whether it is possible at all: output can be at potential but still not be sustainable. Yet a chapter of the International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook illuminates just this scenario. We may even be living in it.
Output is “at potential” when it does not generate inflationary or deflationary pressure. Sustainability — and I am referring here to financial sustainability, not the environmental kind — is something else entirely. Output is financially sustainable when spending patterns and the distribution of income are such that the fruit of economic activity can be absorbed without creating dangerous imbalances in the financial system. It is unsustainable if generating enough demand to absorb the output of the economy requires too much borrowing, real rates of interest rates that are far below zero, or both.


To see how that predicament might arise, start by imagining an economy that is balanced in the sense that the amount of money which households and businesses wish to save is exactly the same as the amount they wished to spend on physical investments. So far, so good. But suppose growth of potential output then fell sharply. The level of desired investment would also fall, because the needed capital stock would be smaller. But the amount that people wished to save might not fall, or not by as much; in fact, if people expect to be poorer in future, they might even wish to save more. If so, real interest rates might need to decline sharply, to restore balance between investment and savings.
Such a decline in real interest rates might also trigger a rise in the price of long-term assets and an associated surge in credit. These effects would offer a temporary remedy to the faltering demand. But if the credit boom later collapsed, leaving borrowers struggling to refinance debt, demand would then operate under a double burden. The medium-term consequences of excess debt and a risk-averse financial sector would aggravate the longer-term consequences of the weaker potential growth.
The WEO illuminates one important aspect of such a story. Potential output, it argues, is indeed growing more slowly than before. In the advanced countries, the decline began in the early 2000s; in emerging economies, after 2009. (See charts.)
Before the crisis, the principal cause of the slowdown in the advanced economies was a decline in the growth of “total factor productivity” — a measure of the output generated by a given amount of capital and labour. One explanation was the waning of the beneficial economic impact of the internet. Another was the decline in the rate of improvement in human skills. After the crisis, potential growth fell still further, partly because of the collapse in investment. The ageing of the population has also been important.
In emerging economies, too, demographic factors have been at work: the decline in the growth of the working-age population is particularly dramatic in China. Capital growth is also falling after a huge investment boom in the 2000s, again particularly in China. Growth of total factor productivity might also fall in the longer run, as the rate of catch-up on advanced economies slows.
This decline in potential growth leads directly to the debate about the savings glut and secular stagnation. Two important distinctions emerge: between the local and the global, and between the temporary and the permanent. The global slowdown in potential growth casts light on both.
Ben Bernanke, former chairman of the US Federal Reserve, rightly argues that ultra-low real interest rates should not be determined purely by local conditions. In an economy where desired savings exceed desired investment, it should be able to export excess savings via a current account surplus. That is what Germany has been doing. 
Yet difficulties arise. First, as the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman notes, the real exchange rate may just not fall far enough. If so, the economy might suffer from permanent stagnation instead. Second, the rest of the world might be unable to run offsetting deficits sustainably. This was what happened in the run-up to 2007. The deficits run by the US, Spain and a number of other countries as a counterpart to the surpluses of China, the oil exporters, Germany and other high-income economies turned out to be frighteningly unsustainable.
Now turn to the no less fundamental distinction between temporary and permanent excesses of desired savings over investment. The main difference between Mr Bernanke and Lawrence Summers, former US Treasury secretary, is over precisely this.
Mr Bernanke suggests that the conditions generating ultra-low real interest rates are temporary. Obvious examples are the now-vanished surpluses of oil exporters. Again, the pre-crisis current account surpluses of China have largely disappeared. The crisis-induced slump should also be temporary.
Against this, Mr Summers suggests that at least some of the conditions predated the crisis and are likely to be longer lasting. Among these was the weakness of private-sector investment in high-income economies. 
The IMF’s point about slowing potential growth supports Mr Summers. Lower potential growth might then also be less sustainable growth. If so, we might find that the world economy is characterised by weak investment, low real and nominal interest rates, credit bubbles and unmanageable debt in the long term.
Such a disappointing future is not inevitable. But we cannot assume we will enjoy a brighter one. National, regional and global reforms are needed to accelerate potential growth and reduce instability. What form these might take is a subject for another day.

Sunday, May 10, 2015

China: Overborrowed and overbuilt - Financial Times

May 4, 2015 at 7:53pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/8b2ce9c4-a2ed-11e4-9c06-00144feab7de.html?segid=0200783#axzz3ZA6FwqUM



January 29, 2015 6:54 pm

China: Overborrowed and overbuilt

Jamil Anderlini
Its economy has become the world’s largest but a credit-fuelled construction binge threatens growth
©DreamstimeWangjing’s Soho building: analysts fear areas such as the Beijing suburb face a perfect storm of overcapacity, demographic shifts and the potential for local debt crises
The last time China was the world’s largest economy Beijing was a city of about 700,000 people, and its Wangjing district was nothing but a jumble of barren man-made hills built to protect the capital from barbarian invaders to the north. That was 1890. Today, Beijing’s population is more than 21m and Wangjing is an expanse of half-empty or half-built offices and residential towers inside the city’s fifth ring road.China has regained its title as the world’s biggest economy, overtaking the US in purchasing power terms for the first time in 125 years, but this growing suburb provides a stark example of the mounting problems the country faces. The restoration of its pre-eminent position comes just as China steps into the so-called “middle-income trap” and as serious stresses built up over the past few years threaten to come to a head.

With its mix of old apartment blocks and gleaming but empty futuristic office towers Wangjing is typical of the credit-fuelled property construction of the past decade, which boosted growth, but at a high price.
China’s official growth rate of 7.4 per cent last year was the slowest pace since 1990, when the country still faced sanctions in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. The International Monetary Fund has lowered its growth forecast for China this year from 7.1 per cent to 6.8 per cent and predicts the country’s gross domestic product will grow slower than India next year for the first time in decades.
Places like Wangjing are representative of “the huge amount of property stock, the potential for local debt crises and the unfavourable demographic shifts that will cause the real estate downturn to last for at least another three years,” according to Ai Jingwei, a property market commentator.
Although growth of 7.4 per cent (or even 6.8 per cent) remains the envy of slow-growing developed economies in the west it is a far cry from the double-digit average annual expansion China maintained for three decades starting in the late 1970s.
As recently as the start of 2010, China’s economy was expanding by about 12 per cent in a surge of credit and construction unleashed by Beijing to counter the effects of the 2008 global financial crisis.
One of the biggest problems China faces now is that the slowdown is happening even as credit and construction, the main drivers of growth, are continuing almost unabated.
‘Disorderly unwinding’
While Beijing suburbs such as Wangjing are representative of this over-borrowing and overbuilding, the problem is even more acute in smaller cities that will never see the demand for real estate that should eventually catch up with supply in the capital.
When ancillary industries are taken into account, real estate construction makes up about a quarter of China’s $10tn economy, a higher proportion than the US, Ireland or Spain at the height of their property bubbles last decade. Nearly a decade of frantic building has created massive overcapacity and left vast belts of empty apartment blocks ringing most Chinese cities.
Last year, the gravity-defying rises of the previous decade, which have seen prices quadruple in major cities, finally came to a halt. Average nationwide housing prices were down 4.3 per cent in December from 12 months earlier.
But total investment in the sector still increased 10.5 per cent for the year and unsold floor space was up by more than 26 per cent by the end of December, according to official figures.
The data suggests the correction in China’s real estate sector has not even really begun. When the sector starts to contract, which could be as early as this year, the headline growth rate could fall much faster and the country could face a wave of bankruptcies — as well as a possible debt crisis, economists warn.
The “slowdown in China could turn into a disorderly unwinding of financial vulnerabilities with considerable implications for the global economy,” the World Bank warned this month.
The impact is already being felt in global commodity prices, including oil, and in the stuttering performance of economies in Brazil, Germany, Australia and much of Asia, which are increasingly reliant on Chinese demand.
Prices of commodities, such as iron ore and copper — key ingredients in any construction boom, are trading close to levels last seen in the midst of the global financial crisis, and that is before the Chinese construction correction has even properly happened.

The financial vulnerabilities are particularly concentrated at the local government level, where provincial officials have ignored budget constraints and a ban on borrowing to indulge in a credit and construction binge.
Local government debt
By the middle of 2013, the last time the government published any data, outstanding local government debt stood at Rmb18tn, up 80 per cent in just two years. That increase happened even after Beijing forbid local officials from raising excessive amounts of money.
But even as the economy slowed last year and officials were tasked with propping up growth with even more infrastructure investment, local government borrowing appears to have surged again. Partial statistics on local government fundraising shows they sold Rmb1.66tn worth of bonds in 2014, compared with Rmb900bn in each of the two previous years.
As with the continued rise in property investment, the government’s stated goal of deleveraging has not yet begun, which means that when it does the economy could slow much more sharply.
The links between the two biggest risks to China’s economy — the property sector and local government debt — make the situation more alarming.
Local governments rely on sales of land for 35 per cent of their revenues, according to research from Deutsche Bank, and virtually all of their outstanding debt is collateralised by government-owned land that is often seriously overvalued.
In a recent study that raises concerns about the sustainability of current growth rates, Zhang Zhiwei, chief China economist for Deutsche Bank, found that local governments have become the dominant buyers of land in the past few years. To avoid a ban on running deficits local governments have set up thousands of wholly-owned “financing vehicles” that have borrowed money on their behalf from state banks, bond markets and lightly regulated underground institutions.
This process is technically illegal but has been tolerated because it bolstered growth in the wake of the global financial crisis.
As real estate sales have slumped and demand for land from commercial developers has evaporated, local officials have started using these financing vehicles to purchase land from themselves using credit from both state-owned and shadow banks. Officials and analysts worry that this is an unsustainable attempt to boost short-term growth and flagging fiscal revenues.
“In 2015, China will probably face the worst fiscal challenge since 1981 [before growth accelerated],” Mr Zhang wrote in his report. “We believe the fiscal slide [the fall in revenues] is the top risk for the Chinese economy and it is not well recognised in the market.”
As well as the slowest growth in a quarter of a century, 2014 marked the first time the ruling Communist party had missed its annual growth target since the height of the Asian financial crisis in 1998.
Officials and some analysts argue that last year’s goal of “around 7.5 per cent” growth was not really missed because the government, anticipating a slower pace, had made it more of a soft target by introducing the word “around” for the first time. The government is set to announce a growth target of “around 7 per cent” this year.
But even Lou Jiwei, China’s finance minister, tells visiting dignitaries that Beijing will be happy with 6 per cent growth in coming years. In private, he warns that just to maintain that growth will require very high levels of government-led infrastructure investment.
Given the mounting problems at home it is little wonder China’s leaders see the title of world’s largest economy as a burden that brings unwanted attention. In fact, Beijing has so far refused to even acknowledge the new estimates, which attempt to adjust for the relative value of non-tradable goods and services in different economies.
Beijing in denial
“Recently there have been some scholars and media who estimated China’s GDP has already surpassed the US in purchasing power terms, but China and the National Bureau of Statistics do not recognise these opinions,” China’s genial statistician-in-chief said last week as he revealed the country’s latest growth figures.
“The problem comes from not being able to include identical goods in the complex basket of goods you compare [across different economies] — in China’s consumer basket of goods the main food items are steamed buns and rice, while European friends perhaps have a lot of bread in their basket. You can’t really compare them.”
Arguments over the relative value of carbohydrates aside, officials quite reasonably point out that China ranks 89th in the world in terms of per capita GDP, a better measure of the wealth of a population, putting it on a par with the Maldives or Peru. They also argue the latest estimates seriously overvalue the quality of items available in the Chinese market.
“China is only just entering the ranks of middle-income economies and is facing all of these headwinds so it really doesn’t want to accept the global responsibilities . . . of being the world’s number one economy,” says one person who was involved in the heated discussions over the new estimate.
Using the government’s current exchange rates China’s slowing economy topped $10tn for the first time last year, while the US economy is accelerating and is bigger than $17.5tn.
According to research by the British economist Angus Maddison, China had the world’s biggest economy for nearly two millennia and in 1820 it accounted for 33 per cent of the world’s GDP, or about the same proportion the US accounted for in 2000. But by 1890, after decades of internal rebellion and foreign incursions, China had lost its number one spot to the US in purchasing power terms.
Back then China’s exports only accounted for 0.6 per cent of GDP, there were virtually no imports of machinery or other modern inputs and opium still accounted for more than a quarter of Chinese imports.
Today China is the world’s biggest trader of goods and the biggest consumer of everything from iron ore to powdered milk. So unlike the 1890s, when its economy was still largely self-sufficient and had little impact globally, the rest of the world now needs to pay close attention to half-built office towers in the suburbs of Beijing.


Distortions in the data – Is the real growth figure much lower?
Amid all the discussion about China’s growth rate, some economists believe the world’s new biggest economy is already growing much slower than Beijing will admit.
Rodney Jones, who headed the Hong Kong research office of Soros Fund Management from 1994 to 2000 and is credited with predicting the Asian financial crisis, estimates China’s growth rate last year — officially 7.6 per cent — was actually 5.6 per cent.
He argues the headline rate is distorted by the way Beijing calculates value-added output in the industrial and manufacturing sectors. Instead, he uses the government’s own unadjusted industrial production figures to recalculate gross domestic product.
“The lower rate of 5.6 per cent is much more consistent with what we see happening in global commodity markets, and in other indicators like power production,” says Mr Jones, who runs his own advisory firm, Wigram Capital. “It also fits with producer price deflation, which has plagued China for 34 consecutive months — the longest period for the country on record.”
The prices of many commodities are close to the depressed levels they reached in the global financial crisis. Wholesale prices fell 3.3 per cent at the end of 2014 and power generation expanded just 3.2 per cent.
Senior Chinese officials say their plan is to support the economy by continuing to pump huge amounts of credit and infrastructure investment into the system. But they see it as a stopgap measure to give them time to overhaul an obsolete economic model and make growth driven more by consumption, services and innovation.
The question is whether the ruling Communist party can maintain sufficient growth to ensure employment and stave off social unrest in the medium term, while reforming the model that served it so well for more than three decades.

Saturday, May 9, 2015

The US shale revolution - Financial Times

May 4, 2015 at 8:32pm
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/2ded7416-e930-11e4-a71a-00144feab7de.html?segid=0200783#slide0

April 24, 2015 11:50 am

The US shale revolution

Ed Crooks
How it changed the world (and why nothing will ever be the same again)

Last summer, Juan Ramos had four jobs; now he has none. A year ago, feeling frustrated and underpaid working in health insurance in Florida, he was stirred by stories of the fabulous money that could be made in the oil boom town of Williston, North Dakota. So he made the 1,800-mile journey north to find a town that lived up to all of his expectations. 


A job promised by an acquaintance failed to materialise but it did not matter. He quickly found work doing landscaping, as a nightclub bouncer and with two oil companies, fitting the steel casing used to line wells.
He had no prior experience in oil — his only training was studying videos on YouTube — but that did not bother his employers. He liked the physical work in the oilfield as well as his $24 an hour wages — almost double what he had been making in Florida — and soon he packed in his other jobs and went full-time with one of the oil companies. In four months, he took home $25,000. He was living the dream. “I’d never worked an 18-hour day until I came here. I’d never worked in temperatures of negative 30 degrees,” he says. “I got the opportunity, and I just took it.”
It did not last. In January the company cut his wages to $20 an hour and, soon after that, he was laid off. Kitted out in the roughneck’s uniform of thick beard and dark hoody, he now comes to the state job service office in Williston to polish up his CV. There are still hundreds of jobs in the oil industry on offer here but the number of openings in construction and extraction has fallen by a third since June. A year ago, employers would take almost anyone. Today they can pick and choose.
There are other jobs Ramos could take but he really wants to stay in the oil business. “I’m not going to come out here to work fast food,” he says. “I don’t want to do another job and hate it because it’s not an oil job.”

Innovation of the century

Ramos was brought to Williston by perhaps the most important innovation of the 21st century: the technology for extracting oil from unyielding shale rocks. The Bakken formation, which runs underneath North Dakota and into Montana and southern Canada, is one of the largest oilfields opened up by that revolution. Along with similar oil-producing areas in Texas, it has transformed the outlook for US energy security, created hundreds of thousands of high-paying jobs and rattled the leaders of rival oil-producing countries from Riyadh to Caracas. It has also struck a blow against the idea that world oil production is at or close to its ultimate peak. US oil output peaked in 1970, and until 2009 appeared to be in inexorable long-term decline. Now it has been reborn.
“The US is going to give Saudi Arabia and Russia a run for their money in terms of being the world’s number-one oil producer,” says Daniel Yergin, author of the classic history of oil, The Prize. “And that just wasn’t on the cards five years ago. It’s that recent.”
The industry is still evolving rapidly. Flourishing innovation in the Bakken and the other centres of US oil production has turned them into the energy industry’s equivalent of Silicon Valley: crucibles of creative activity where engineers collaborate and compete to push back the frontiers of technology. Ideas being developed here could one day be deployed anywhere in the world, because countries from Argentina to China have their own shale reserves, and are looking to follow the US lead.
While the new oil industry is still in its infancy, though, it is facing its first real test. American oil producers have become victims of their own success. In the past nine months, the flood of new oil supply they created has caused a collapse in the price of crude, which dropped from more than $100 per barrel last June to less than $50 in January.
The price fall has been like a bucket of cold water in the face for Williston and other oil boom towns, waking them up from the frenzy of the past half-decade to a more sober reality. The US oil industry is battling to adapt and survive in these new harsher conditions. The future of world oil markets and, hence, of the world economy, hangs on its success.

The ‘Apple of oil’

Mark Papa remembers the precise moment he decided the American oil renaissance had to happen. Avuncular and mildly spoken, he is the antithesis of the stereotypical two-fisted Texas oilman. But the company he led until the end of 2013, EOG Resources, has been one of the great success stories of the boom, dubbed “the Apple of oil” by the analyst Paul Sankey because of its ability to translate innovation into a profitable business.
EOG came from the most unpromising of beginnings. Its original name was Enron Oil & Gas Company and, until 1999, it was majority owned by Enron, the fraudulent energy group that collapsed in 2001. Having secured EOG’s independence just in time, though, Papa led it to a strong position in the fast-growing shale gas industry.
Innovations driven by an industry veteran called George Mitchell had made it possible for the first time to produce gas at commercially viable rates from formations such as the Barnett Shale of north Texas. EOG was an early adopter of the technology, discovering abundant reserves of shale gas that would provide fuel for power generation and heating, and raw materials for the petrochemicals industry. Unfortunately, many other companies were doing the same.
“The amounts of shale gas that were being uncovered [in 2002-06] were just astonishing,” says Papa, now a partner at the private equity firm Riverstone Holdings. “It was very obvious that there had been just a huge breakthrough in technology, and the amounts of commercial gas available in North America were absolutely mind-boggling.”
Papa’s revelation came in January 2007, when he was presenting at a Goldman Sachs conference alongside a couple of EOG’s rivals, listening to them talking about their vast discoveries and their prospects for rapid growth.
“It struck me like a lightning bolt,” he says. “There were so many companies finding so much gas . . . And I thought: ‘You know, the gas price in North America is about to be ruined for the next 30 to 40 years.’ And I sat there on this panel, looking at the two CEOs on my left and my right, and I thought: ‘I wonder if they realise what has just hit me.’”
In October of that year, at the annual meeting of EOG’s divisional managers in Scottsdale, Arizona, he spelt out the implications of his insight.
“I hate to tell you this, guys,” he remembers telling them. “You have to go back to your divisions and tell your geologists to stop finding gas — stop finding the component they’ve been looking for for the past 40 years of their careers — and immediately switch to finding shale oil.”

The science of shale

When you look at a piece of heavy, tightly packed shale, it seems inconceivable that oil could ever flow out of it. It would be like squeezing blood from a stone. For decades, conventional wisdom in the industry agreed. Shales were known as “source rock”: the places where oil and gas was formed as organic matter was “cooked” over tens or hundreds of millions of years. But geologists generally believed that the resources could be extracted only if they had migrated to “reservoir rock”, typically sandstones, where there were interconnected pore spaces through which the oil and gas could flow. If you drill a well into reservoir rock, the pressure underground can send the oil and gas flowing up to the surface, in a gusher if you are lucky. Traditionally, if you drilled a well into shale, you were wasting your time.

Technology that built a revolutionHorizontal drilling
Traditional oil wells go straight down, but since the 1980s many more commercial wells have gone first down, then round a corner, then out horizontally for another mile or more. Their advantage is that they expose a much greater area in a layer of oil-bearing rock.
Multi-stage hydraulic fracturing
Hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, uses water, sand and chemicals pumped into a well to open small cracks that will release the oil or gas. It has been used since the 1940s. Refinements to the technology have opened up previously unyielding shales for first gas, then oil.
Walking rigs
The most modern rigs are able to “walk” from hole to hole on stubby legs, making them more flexible and cheaper to move.

Sand is used in fracking fluids to “prop” open cracks created in the rock so the oil and gas can flow out. Companies are experimenting with various proppants, such as ceramics, which can give better results.

Every well is different, and drilling generates a wealth of data about pressures, types of rock, the way it was fracked, the proppant used. After six years of production, data can be analysed to see which methods and conditions have generated the best results. Deploying that IT effectively is key to the future of the shale revolution.
Advances in two technologies in the late 1990s and early 2000s changed all that, although at first only for gas. Hydraulic fracturing — injecting a mixture of water, sand and chemicals underground at high pressure — cracks the rock to release the gas. Horizontal drilling — sinking a well a mile or more straight down, then a mile or more sideways — made it possible to expose a much greater area of resource-bearing rock. Neither practice was entirely new but refining the techniques and combining them transformed the commercial viability of shale gas.
Yet even after shale gas production had become an established fact, Papa says, the “industry dogma” was that the same could never be true for oil.
Conventional wisdom held that while small gas molecules might be able to slip through the tiny pore spaces in shale rocks, much larger oil molecules could not. “If you had taken a poll in 2005 of 1,000 industry executives, 999 of them would have said you cannot flow oil commercially through shales, because the hydrocarbon size of oil is too large,” he says.
Rather than taking the conventional wisdom on trust, Papa was determined to find out for himself. EOG studied shales using CAT scanners, and concluded that although the pore spaces were small, they were still big enough for oil to flow through them. Even so, when Papa announced his planned pivot to oil, many of EOG’s managers were sceptical.
“You could have heard a pin drop in that room,” he says. “Some of them probably were thinking, ‘Poor Mark, he’s lost his mind.’”
Regardless of their reservations, though, “like good soldiers”, EOG’s geologists dutifully set about looking for oil. What they found was the Eagle Ford shale of south Texas, running from around Austin south and west into Mexico. It was a formation that was known to hold a lot of oil but the rest of the industry had ignored it because other companies could see no viable way to get the crude out. EOG spent a year quietly signing oil leases with landowners, and drilled its first well there early in 2009, using the same techniques of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing that had proved so effective for gas. The results were a spectacular success. By April of the following year, EOG was able to tell investors that it had found reserves of about 900 million barrels of oil.
. . .
While EOG was preparing to drill its first oil well in the Eagle Ford shale, another company called Brigham Exploration was transforming the outlook for the Bakken, 1,300 miles to the north. Hundreds of oil wells had been drilled in North Dakota since 1951, mostly going straight down through the shale to reach the more co-operative reservoir rock below. The state had a mini-oil boom in the late 1970s, achieved by tapping the conventional reservoir rock, but that petered out in the 1980s.
Since 1987, companies had been drilling horizontal wells to tap the Bakken formation but with only limited success. The rock is not a pure shale: most of the oil is contained in a layer of dolomite sandwiched between two layers of shale, making it somewhat easier to tap than the Eagle Ford, but the wells had always been respectable rather than spectacular producers.
EOG had drilled a successful horizontal well in the Bakken in 2006, near the town of Parshall, east of Williston. But that still seemed to indicate potential for only a small portion of the formation, and Mark Papa was cautious about committing too much investment there.
“We made a tactical mistake in retrospect,” he says now. “We weren’t sure what we had . . . We could have owned the Bakken play, literally, at that time.” Instead of tying up drilling rights to all the acreage in the Bakken, EOG signed up about a fifth of it, leaving plenty of room for its competitors.
Late in 2008, Brigham experimented with a Bakken well called Brad Olson 10-15 #1H. The plan was to drill a long horizontal well, running sideways for about 10,000 feet, and frack it in 20 stages, allowing the force to be applied more precisely.
“At the time there were a lot of people saying, ‘You can’t do that,’” says Russell Rankin, who worked for Brigham then. “There were a lot of firsts. It had never been done, so there’s a lot of naysayers that say you can’t do it.”
The naysayers were wrong. Other wells in the area produced about 240 barrels per day when they started up. The Olson well had initial production of more than 1,400 b/d. Brigham’s later wells did even better. “We not only proved that the technology could be done but we also did it in an area where they didn’t think the rock was good enough,” Rankin says.
EOG’s Parshall well could have been an anomaly. Brigham’s Olson well showed there were large areas of the Bakken that could be made to produce oil at commercially attractive rates. “The economic acreage dramatically expanded with that one well,” Rankin says. “When this well was drilled and completed, people’s minds started opening up.”
Innovations are hard to protect in the oil business, and Brigham’s success was quickly emulated. Companies with drilling rights in the Bakken, including Continental Resources, Hess and Whiting Petroleum as well as EOG, began to pour money into the area, drilling their own horizontal wells with multi-stage fracks. The number of drilling rigs in North Dakota doubled from May to December 2009, from 35 to 75, and then doubled again to 173 by the end of 2010. The sleepy rural town of Williston, residents say, “went crazy”.

Boomtown, USA

Oil companies and the businesses that support them were desperate for workers, and people flocked to North Dakota from all over the country to meet that need. “It was insane,” says Cindy Sanford, manager of the Williston job service. The town grew from 14,787 residents at the 2010 census to an estimated “service population” of about 32,000.
Thousands were put up in “man camps”: clusters of prefabricated huts where workers would sleep and eat while working 12-hour days for two solid weeks, returning to their homes across the country for two-week breaks.
Others turned up on spec without a job or anywhere to live. An NBC Nightly Newssegment in October 2011, describing Williston as “where the jobs are”, at a time when the US recovery was slow and the national unemployment rate was 8.8 per cent, drew a flood of hopeful newcomers.
“People would walk in here and say, ‘I just came in from Florida,’” Sanford says. “They were sleeping in their cars because there was no housing.”
The roads were jammed with trucks and Ford pickups. You might have to wait in line for 90 minutes to get your hair cut at Walmart, or for two hours to get a table at one of the town’s handful of restaurants. Rents for single-bedroom homes were the highest in the country, according to a survey for Apartment Guide last year, at $2,394 per month; more than in the metropolitan areas of New York or San Francisco.
Businesses catering to the predominantly male oilfield workforce, including bars, strip clubs and tattoo parlours, did roaring trade. Boomtown Babes, a bright pink hut in a hotel car park, opened with women in vests selling “the Bakken’s breast coffee”, charging more than $7 for a large double-shot latte.
The crime rate, which had been well below the US average, rose sharply. There were 1,328 felony arrests in Williston last year, more than twice as many as in 2013.
Williston’s infrastructure scrambled to keep up. There are new and half-built homes all around the city and plans for a $500m mall development, expansion of the water treatment system and a new airport.
Shale oil has transformed US energy security and rattled leaders of rival oil countries from Riyadh to Caracas
“We’re playing SimCity in real life,” says Jeff Zarling of Dawa Solutions, a local web design and marketing firm. “We had to build everything.”
The sign as you come into Williston still says “Boomtown, USA” but the town is not really booming any longer. The streets are quieter now and the wait for a haircut is shorter. A couple of the man camps on the outskirts of town are closing.
The number of rigs drilling for oil in the Williston Basin has slumped from 190 at the end of November to just 89 at the beginning of April. With each rig supporting about 120 jobs, that is about 12,000 jobs gone from the region in the past five months. Reported unemployment in the county is still only 1.9 per cent — low by any standard — but the days of just turning up and having a choice of jobs are gone.
“We used to say if you walk in through the door, there’s four jobs for you,” says Cindy Sanford. “Now there’s maybe a job and a half.”
The neon adverts around Williston for petrol at $2.49 per gallon, about a third less than it cost last summer, are constant reminders of the reason for that. The Bakken and other centres of the US oil boom have suffered the same fate that Mark Papa foresaw for the gas industry: they have been too successful for their own good.

The oil price collapse

Between 2010 and 2015, US oil production grew in a way that has few parallels in the history of the industry. In 2009 it averaged 5.4 million barrels of crude per day. Last month, it was 9.4 million, approaching the all-time high of a little over 10 million reached in 1970.
Rents for single-bedroom homes in Williston last year were the highest in the country, at $2,394 per month — more than in New York or San Francisco
Mark Papa had believed that oil was less at risk of becoming oversupplied because, unlike gas, it is sold in an integrated global market. The US does not export much crude oil but it exports a lot of refined products such as diesel fuel, and rising crude production has displaced imports from Africa and the Middle East. From 2011 to the summer of 2014, the steady flow of additional oil from the US was offset in world markets by disruptions to supplies from other countries, including Libya’s civil war and the sanctions imposed on Iran because of its nuclear programme. Even as US output soared, world oil prices remained remarkably steady at about $100-$110 per barrel.
Last summer, though, the balance in the market began to shift. US production was roaring ahead even faster than expected, as oil companies discovered new techniques to boost their output. At the same time, global demand growth was faltering, partly because of the slowdown in China.
The conditions were right for a conflagration in oil markets. When Saudi Arabia signalled that it would not cut its production to support prices, it lit a match. The kingdom, which is the most influential member of Opec, the producing countries’ cartel, had been hinting since October that it would not support production cuts. Right up until the Opec meeting in Vienna on November 27, though, there were many who still hoped the Saudis would spring a surprise and back a cut after all. When that did not happen, the price of oil collapsed. Much of US shale production, which typically has higher costs than oil in the Middle East, became unprofitable.
Production from shale wells declines very quickly, so companies need to keep drilling just to keep their output level. The plunging numbers of active rigs have already been reflected in small falls in oil production in the Bakken and the Eagle Ford shale. If the rig counts stay at these levels or fall further, it is likely that US production will drop, too.
Harold Hamm, the son of an Oklahoma sharecropper who is now the billionaire majority owner of Continental Resources, one of the pioneers of the Bakken, says Saudi Arabia has been engaged in “predatory pricing”, aimed at the US industry.
“They realised that this was a big threat. The development of these shales is a threat to their market share,” he says. “So they are using predatory pricing to try to drag us down, to take the price down and kill this industry. And they’re doing a pretty good job of it. In 120 days they’ve laid down over half the rigs drilling for oil in this country.”
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Like many in Williston, Rich Vestal takes a close interest in Opec. But he thinks its power is waning. “The American dream is to be self-sufficient,” he says, and in oil he thinks that point is getting closer, regardless of the latest downturn in the US industry. He came to Williston in the last oil boom, in the late 1970s, working for a company that went bust because it had overextended. With the customers and staff he had built up, and a $15,000 loan that he told the bank was for home improvements, he started his own company, Red River Oilfield Services, which has now been in business for 37 years. A large part of its business is in supplying chemicals for the “mud” used in drilling wells, so its fortunes are directly tied to the number of rigs in the area.
Oil companies are under pressure to cut their costs and strengthen profitability, and that gets passed on to their suppliers. Some have told Red River they want 40 per cent cuts in rates.
“It is tough,” says Curtis Shuck, Red River’s vice-president of business development. “Suppliers are out of flesh to cut and they are getting down to the bone. It’s pretty damn painful.” A year ago the company had about 120 employees; today it is down to 80.
Financially weaker countries that rely on oil revenues, and have no cushion against price swings, face government dysfunction or even ‘state failure’
But Vestal remembers times that have been just as bad in the past. In 1985, the North Dakota rig count fell from 225 to just two. “We went for 32 days without filling a single delivery,” he says. “It was really ugly.” The industry has been up and down and up before, and he expects it will be up again in time.
Petroleum Services is another Williston oil industry supplier that has been shedding jobs, laying off about 30 people from its workforce of 137 last year. If conditions do not improve, says Mihir Varia, its business analyst, it will have to lose 30 more. It is under huge pressure to cut the rates it charges customers. But Varia says there are limits on how far its rates can go. “If we need another 20 per cent off the selling price, we can’t survive.”
Petroleum Services and companies like it, however, offer part of the solution to the industry’s crisis. Costs tend to be higher in the Bakken than in the US oil boom areas in Texas, in part because North Dakota has not developed an ecosystem of suppliers to support a large-scale industry. When something breaks, the replacement part has often had to be trucked in from Houston or Calgary, at great cost in time and money. Building up a stronger network of local suppliers will be one way to keep costs down.
In rolling grassland about an hour from Williston, the peace is broken by the roar of machinery. Packed into a gravel area a few hundred yards across are 12 large trucks with high-pressure pumps, a row of water tanks, and trailers carrying sand, to frack a group of wells for Statoil, the Norwegian oil company. Statoil bought Brigham Exploration for $4.4bn in 2011, and has since been the most successful foreign operator in US shale.
The workers, masked against the flurries of sand that get whipped up into the air, keep the frack job ticking like a well-regulated machine. There are eight wells on one site, spreading out below the surface, and four are being completed simultaneously. The pumps are connected to a well, and about 200,000 gallons of water are pumped in to frack a single section. Then a plug is put in to seal that well temporarily while a stage is fracked on the next one, and so on, in rotation.
Drilling and completing wells this way can be a much cheaper and more efficient way to operate than making each of them a one-off. Russell Rankin, now a manager of geology at Statoil, says that in 2013-14, a well took them 22 or 23 days to drill and complete. Now it takes just 10 or 11.
In the early days of the shale boom, it was the smaller companies such as EOG and Brigham that innovated. Now, Rankin says, Statoil and other larger companies need to be equally nimble and creative, to drill more wells with each rig, and recover more oil from each well. “You keep pushing that envelope,” Rankin says. “There’s a lot of efficiencies left to gain there.”
New technologies are coming into use all the time: new fracking fluids, better drills, more sensors to deliver data on what is happening down the well, and more computer power to analyse that data to inform decisions about how the next well should be drilled. There are also more straightforward savings to be achieved simply by managing operations better.
During the boom, the industry was “out of control”, says Curtis Shuck of Red River. “When things were going crazy, nobody had time to think about it. You couldn’t help but make money,” he says. “Now we’re doing it right.” There is no “one single silver bullet that’s going to cure the woes of the entire industry,” he adds. “But by everybody digging deep and pulling together, all of a sudden the economics start to make sense.”
There is a consensus in Williston that if oil were to rebound to $70 per barrel for benchmark US crude, compared to $56 last week, the industry would pick up. In effect, that would put a ceiling on oil prices, because as soon as oil becomes expensive enough, there will be more drilling and more supply coming on the market. Harold Hamm of Continental Resources expects oil to recover but thinks the rebound will be limited. “We’ll maybe get $75 or $80,” he says. “But we won’t get the $120-$130 that the Saudis want.”

Global instability

The US oil boom has had profound implications for the rest of the world, boosting economic growth and enhancing America’s global influence. The Prize’s Daniel Yergin, who is vice-chairman of IHS, the research firm, argues it was critical in putting pressure on Iran to negotiate a deal over its nuclear programme. International sanctions that cut Iran’s oil exports were effective because oil markets were reassured that rising US production would provide an alternative source of supply. Without the shale boom, Yergin says, “There would not be a preliminary agreement with Iran, because Iran would not have had to come to the table.”
The boom has helped put pressure on other geopolitical rivals of the US. In Russia, the collapse in the price of oil, its principal export, has added to the problems facing President Vladimir Putin, already squeezed by western sanctions over the undeclared invasion of eastern Ukraine. Low oil prices are an indiscriminate weapon, though: they also hurt US allies including Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and Iraq, which has been warning that the strain on its finances is hampering its fight against the Islamic State.
If the international oil price does hit a new ceiling at about $80 per barrel, the countries that need a higher price to balance their budgets will come under growing financial strain.
A weaker oil price is on balance good news for the world economy, adding an expected 0.5 to 1 per cent to global growth this year, according to World Bank estimates. The effect on some of the losers from cheaper oil, however, could be catastrophic. “The shale revolution is the most politically disruptive factor in the global oil market since the formation of Opec in 1960,” says Edward Morse, head of commodity research at Citigroup. Financially weaker countries that rely on their oil revenues, that have not built up large reserves to cushion against price swings, and that cannot readily diversify into other industries, face the threat of government dysfunction or even “state failure”, Morse says. “This is a recipe for global instability.”
Past periods of low or falling oil prices have contributed to political upheavals including the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Soviet Union’s collapse in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and the 1998 election that gave Hugo Chávez the presidency of Venezuela. Consumers enjoying lower fuel prices resulting from the US shale boom should watch out for the turbulence following in its wake.
Oil producers praying for relief from low prices might take heart from the lost jobs and idled rigs in the US. But the American strengths that made the boom — entrepreneurial culture, depth of knowledge in oil and gas, innovation and supportive capital markets — are now being deployed to keep it alive. Recent history suggests it would be rash to bet against them.
“Look how far we’ve come since 2006,” says Russell Rankin of Statoil. “It’s incredible. So for us to think that we’re through with the technology . . . to say that that’s over is kind of idiotic . . . We’ll always come up with a solution.”
Ed Crooks is the FT’s US industry and energy editor
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The fracking controversy

In many parts of the US and Europe, “fracking” has become a dirty word. New York State, Scotland, France and Bulgaria are among the regions and countries that have introduced bans on fracking that prevent the development of their shale oil and gas resources. In other places, including England and California, the use of fracking is fiercely contested.
In common usage, the word has come to represent not just the specific technique of hydraulic fracturing but the general practice of oil and gas production; a conflation that often fosters confusion in debates between the industry and the public. Concerns about “fracking”, in its broader sense, include the potential for air and water pollution and the risk of small earthquakes, particularly from wells used to dispose of waste water. Environmentalists worried about the threat of climate change also object to the lower cost and increased availability of fossil fuels made possible by fracking.
In North Dakota and Texas, the two centres of the US oil boom, however, the opposition to fracking has a much lower profile, reflecting the industry’s importance to those states’ economies. Concerns about pollution do occasionally crop up but the bigger worries are generally about congestion on the roads and the strain on local infrastructure.