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May 31, 2015 5:56 pm
Europe’s problem is with Russia, not Putin
Thomas Graham
Moscow is not a rising revolutionary force but one seeking to restore power, writes Thomas Graham
In this Wednesday, May 27, 2015 pool photo Russian President Vladimir Putin listens during a meeting in the Kremlin, Moscow, Russia. Putin says the United States is meddling in FIFA's affairs in an attempt to take the 2018 World Cup away from his country. Putin said in televised comments Thursday, May 28, 2015, that it is "odd" that the probe was launched at the request of U.S. officials for crimes which do not involve its citizens and did not happen in the United States. (Alexei Nikolsky/RIA Novosti, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)©AP
The west acts as if it had a Vladimir Putin problem. In fact it has a Russia problem. The Russian president stands within a long tradition of Russian thinking. His departure would fix nothing. Any plausible successor would pursue a similar course, if perhaps with a little less machismo.
The Russia problem is not new. It emerged 200 years ago, at the end of the Napoleonic period, with the opening up of what we would today call a values gap. In the 19th century Russia maintained an autocratic regime as Europe moved towards liberal democracy
Yet Russia remained a great power, essential to European security. How to protect Europe in the presence of a powerful state that is alien in worldview? That was the problem then, as now.
European states seek security in balance; Russia seeks it in strategic depth. That view grows out of its location on the vast, nearly featureless great Eurasian plain, across which armies have moved with ease.
Historically, Russia has pushed its borders outward, as far away as possible from its heartland. It did not stop when it reached defensible physical borders, but only when it ran into powerful countervailing states. Where the west saw imperialism, Moscow saw the erection of defences.
Over time, resistance from the Germanic powers in the west, Great Britain and then the US in the south, and China and Japan in the east, came to define Russia’s zone of security as north central Eurasia, the former Soviet space.
For Moscow, states there face a choice not between independence and Russian domination, but between domination by Russia or a rival. That struggle,
Moscow believes, is playing out in Ukraine.
Also out of security concerns, Russia has opposed the domination of Europe by a single power and remains uncomfortable with greater European unity. The reason is easy to grasp: Russia can be the equal of Great Britain, France, or Germany, but it can never be the equal of a united Europe, which in population, wealth, and power would dwarf it as the US does today. Driving wedges between European states, and between Europe and the US, might forestall the emergence of a serious threat.
Russia’s fears are amplified by a sense of vulnerability. Its economy is stagnating, its technology is no longer cutting-edge, and outside forces — China, the west and radical Islam — are challenging it in the former Soviet space. The temptation is to act tough to cover up the doubts by, for example, flaunting nuclear capabilities.
After more than 20 years of hope that Russia could be brought into the west-led international order, the re-emergence of the Russia problem has shocked the west. But the threat is limited. This is not a rising revolutionary force but a declining state seeking to restore its power.
It can be managed. One way is to revitalise the European project. That means dealing vigorously with the issues fuelling anti-EU forces — the democratic deficit, immigration and inequality.
To be sure, steps such as a Nato presence in the Baltics and robust planning for hybrid-war contingencies are necessary, but the west needs to avoid over-militarising its response to what is largely a political challenge.
At the same time, more should be done to help Ukraine repair its economy and build a competent state as a barrier to Russia’s assault on European norms and unity.
Yet containment will not work in our globalised, increasingly multipolar world , as it did during the cold war. The west cannot contain one of the world’s largest economies, and it is geopolitical malfeasance to weaken unduly a power critical to the equilibrium we hope to create out of today’s turbulence, particularly in Asia.
The hard truth is that Ukraine cannot be rebuilt without Russia. It is simply too reliant on Russia economically, and Russia has too many levers of influence inside Ukraine, for it to be otherwise. Containment has to be leavened with accommodation. Finding the right balance is the challenge.
The writer is a former senior director for Russia on the US National Security Council staff
High quality global journalism requires investment. Please share this article with others using the link below, do not cut & paste the article. See our Ts&Cs and Copyright Policy for more detail. Email ftsales.support@ft.com to buy additional rights. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f0ff7324-03b5-11e5-a70f-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz3bp2A1xE7
May 31, 2015 5:56 pm
Europe’s problem is with Russia, not Putin
Thomas Graham
Moscow is not a rising revolutionary force but one seeking to restore power, writes Thomas Graham
In this Wednesday, May 27, 2015 pool photo Russian President Vladimir Putin listens during a meeting in the Kremlin, Moscow, Russia. Putin says the United States is meddling in FIFA's affairs in an attempt to take the 2018 World Cup away from his country. Putin said in televised comments Thursday, May 28, 2015, that it is "odd" that the probe was launched at the request of U.S. officials for crimes which do not involve its citizens and did not happen in the United States. (Alexei Nikolsky/RIA Novosti, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)©AP
The west acts as if it had a Vladimir Putin problem. In fact it has a Russia problem. The Russian president stands within a long tradition of Russian thinking. His departure would fix nothing. Any plausible successor would pursue a similar course, if perhaps with a little less machismo.
The Russia problem is not new. It emerged 200 years ago, at the end of the Napoleonic period, with the opening up of what we would today call a values gap. In the 19th century Russia maintained an autocratic regime as Europe moved towards liberal democracy
Yet Russia remained a great power, essential to European security. How to protect Europe in the presence of a powerful state that is alien in worldview? That was the problem then, as now.
European states seek security in balance; Russia seeks it in strategic depth. That view grows out of its location on the vast, nearly featureless great Eurasian plain, across which armies have moved with ease.
Historically, Russia has pushed its borders outward, as far away as possible from its heartland. It did not stop when it reached defensible physical borders, but only when it ran into powerful countervailing states. Where the west saw imperialism, Moscow saw the erection of defences.
Over time, resistance from the Germanic powers in the west, Great Britain and then the US in the south, and China and Japan in the east, came to define Russia’s zone of security as north central Eurasia, the former Soviet space.
For Moscow, states there face a choice not between independence and Russian domination, but between domination by Russia or a rival. That struggle,
Moscow believes, is playing out in Ukraine.
Also out of security concerns, Russia has opposed the domination of Europe by a single power and remains uncomfortable with greater European unity. The reason is easy to grasp: Russia can be the equal of Great Britain, France, or Germany, but it can never be the equal of a united Europe, which in population, wealth, and power would dwarf it as the US does today. Driving wedges between European states, and between Europe and the US, might forestall the emergence of a serious threat.
Russia’s fears are amplified by a sense of vulnerability. Its economy is stagnating, its technology is no longer cutting-edge, and outside forces — China, the west and radical Islam — are challenging it in the former Soviet space. The temptation is to act tough to cover up the doubts by, for example, flaunting nuclear capabilities.
After more than 20 years of hope that Russia could be brought into the west-led international order, the re-emergence of the Russia problem has shocked the west. But the threat is limited. This is not a rising revolutionary force but a declining state seeking to restore its power.
It can be managed. One way is to revitalise the European project. That means dealing vigorously with the issues fuelling anti-EU forces — the democratic deficit, immigration and inequality.
To be sure, steps such as a Nato presence in the Baltics and robust planning for hybrid-war contingencies are necessary, but the west needs to avoid over-militarising its response to what is largely a political challenge.
At the same time, more should be done to help Ukraine repair its economy and build a competent state as a barrier to Russia’s assault on European norms and unity.
Yet containment will not work in our globalised, increasingly multipolar world , as it did during the cold war. The west cannot contain one of the world’s largest economies, and it is geopolitical malfeasance to weaken unduly a power critical to the equilibrium we hope to create out of today’s turbulence, particularly in Asia.
The hard truth is that Ukraine cannot be rebuilt without Russia. It is simply too reliant on Russia economically, and Russia has too many levers of influence inside Ukraine, for it to be otherwise. Containment has to be leavened with accommodation. Finding the right balance is the challenge.
The writer is a former senior director for Russia on the US National Security Council staff
