http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2015/07/16/donald-tusk-interview-the-annotated-transcript/
Donald Tusk interview: the annotated transcript
Peter Spiegel Author alerts
| Jul 16 23:01 | Comment | Share
Donald Tusk, the European Council president, listens to a question during Thursday's interview
After spending much of the six-month standoff between Greece and its eurozone creditors on the sidelines, Donald Tusk, the former Polish prime minister who is now European Council president, became the central actor in the Greek drama over the weekend when a summit he chaired became the scene of 17-hour marathon talks that finally led to a deal on Monday morning.
In a 90 minute interview with the Financial Times and six European newspapers, Tusk gave a behind-the-scenes account of how the deal was brokered – but he also gave voice to fears that the standoff has given new energy to radical political forces in Europe that has made 2015 resemble 1968. Our full write-up of the interview, focusing on his concerns about renewed radicalisation can be read here.
But as is our practice at the Brussels Blog, we’re providing a transcript of the interview below. It is slightly edited to eliminate occasionally long-winded questions and topics not directly related to the Greek crisis.
The interview started with a question on Germany and whether Tusk agreed with some commentators that Berlin’s standing in Europe has been hurt by perceptions Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, bullied Greece and its leader, Alexis Tsipras, into a deal on her terms.
I think the position in Germany today, after this negotiation, is maybe not weaker, but for sure not more powerful. It was one of my main aims in these negotiations, to avoid this risk that someone is a loser and someone is a winner, especially because as you noticed, for sure, the discussion during this economic negotiation was also about things like dignity, humiliation, trust. From history, we know very well that we can’t ignore such values, or such feelings or emotions like dignity, humiliation and trust, especially when we go back to German history. The discussion about dignity and humiliation could recall the most dangerous time in Europe, and this is why I think it’s very important to avoid this dimension in discussions and in negotiation because for sure what we needed was to have no losers and no winners in this context.
I’m quite sure that today the result, this agreement between eurozone member states, it’s something like a draw. It means no losers and no winners. It also means that there’s a very visible lack of enthusiasm. Nobody’s satisfied. But for sure, this is what I’m 100 per cent sure, that Germany is not the winner in the context of political power. The result is rather evidence that the eurozone and the whole EU is also an idea to limit natural advantages of some nations and some countries. At the end of the day, Germany has to sacrifice much more than other countries when it comes to numbers and money. This was the main subject of the whole process.
After this discussion about Germany, Tusk, unprompted, turned to Tsipras’ appearance last week in the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Tusk was also in the chamber reporting on the results of a Tuesday summit where Tsipras had been given five days to propose serious economic reforms or face bankruptcy. Tusk said he was struck by Tsipras’ second address to the parliament – which came after dozens of MEPs had weighed in on the crisis – where he engaged in some anti-German rhetoric.
Tsipras answered and his one mention was very interesting, because it was his opinion about a part of German history. He talked about Germany, after the first and second world wars, they experienced European solidarity and debt relief. And it was a little bit anti-German in tone, can I say, and the context was anti-German. And the reaction of parliamentarians, of the MEPs, was very, very enthusiastic. In fact, it looked like an anti-German demonstration when it came to the left side of the chamber and the radical right. It was the first time I saw radicals with such emotion, in this context anti-German emotion. It was almost half of the European Parliament. This is why I think nobody – but in particular Germany– are political winners in this process.
The interviewers stayed on the topic of Germany, with the next questioner asking about the role of Wolfgang Schäuble, the powerful German finance minister, who tabled a proposal that would have had Greece temporarily leave the eurozone. As a finance minister, Schäuble did not take part in the leaders summit, but Tusk joked: “My feeling is that he was around the table all the time.” Tusk then went on to describe what he believed was a strong difference in opinion between Schäuble and Merkel on the temporary Grexit proposal.
I’m quite sure that this thinking represented by Schäuble, but not only by Schäuble, this possible controlled and prepared Grexit, intellectually it’s legitimate. It’s nothing extravagant. For sure, this was a possible alternative in this process.
It’s just my intuition, but I think it’s also what Wolfgang Schäuble believes. I think he sent this message very openly and clearly that for Europe and for Greece it would be better that Greece is out. But I’m absolutely sure that for Chancellor Merkel, it was only a useful tool in negotiation, but for sure not her political aim. I have no doubts that for all of them, the leaders and Chancellor Merkel, the only political target was to avoid this risk of Grexit. For sure, this role of Schäuble was useful as an argument which showed to Tsipras that the dramatic solution is quite realistic and achievable.
The next questioner asked about the belief expressed by many officials that the deal Tusk brokered on Monday is unlikely to hold and that it only put off the risk of Grexit temporarily.
This agreement is not a guarantee for years. It was something we needed to avoid, this real risk of chaos and possible Greek bankruptcy – and, as a political result, also Grexit. But this is [not even] the first half in a football match, but the first step in a long-perspective work. For now, it works.
Yesterday, the voting in the Greek parliament was full of emotions and, for me, also a controversial message from Tsipras that he’s ready to support an agreement that he doesn’t believe in. That’s, in fact, very original. But I think it’s also very honest and authentic, because when I observed his face during the negotiations it was absolutely visible and tangible that he was not satisfied, and for him this is a really tough test. But it’s shows how difficult this process is and will be, for sure. But it shows also that, for now, it works.
We have no guarantees. This is an ongoing process with some traps, for sure. But what is my intention? It is to avoid today, and tomorrow, to avoid this very risky discussion about trust. We need more [technical] discussions and negotiations. Humiliation and trust and dignity, this is not [technical]. When we are discussing assistance and money for Greece, it’s very important to discuss something [technical] and not emotional and feelings.
In fact, negotiations should be about numbers, laws, procedures. The discussion about dignity, humiliation and trust, this is not a negotiation. It is an introduction to fight, always in our history. I can understand emotions and feeling, and not only on the Greek side. For sure, you observed clear and very strong emotions on Merkel’s face. Emotions, this is not a typically southern specialisation in politics. Cold, Hanseatic politicians are also, from time to time, very emotional.
I try to be realistic, not optimistic. But if we stop this discussion about emotions and values like dignity and humiliation – not to ignore them, but I’m absolutely sure it’s a very important part of politics – but at this very moment we need more pragmatic discussion than political or ideological. It would be too risk to judge who is more humiliated, who has more right to dignity.
Tusk was then asked about whether he had geopolitical concerns as he led the negotiations, particularly whether a Grexit could push Greece into the arms of Russia.
The most important subject of the negotiations was assistance to Greece. This was the first, second and third priority. But as a mid-term or long-term consequence of a possible Grexit, especially as a chaotic and unpredictable process, for sure we have to discuss the possible political consequences, and not only geopolitical consequences.
I was quite sure that there was no risk of financial contagion even if Greece is out. It wasn’t a slogan, it wasn’t propaganda when [ECB president Mario] Draghi and other institutions confirmed the eurozone is relatively safe today and the risk of contagion doesn’t exist. But for sure, after a dramatic event like Grexit, we could predict some political, ideological and geopolitical consequences.
I am really afraid of this ideological or political contagion, not financial contagion, of this Greek crisis. Today’s situation in Greece, including he result of the referendum and the result of the last general election, but also this atmosphere, this mood in some comments – we have something like a new, huge public debate in Europe. Everything is about new ideologies. In fact, it’s nothing new. It’s something like an economic and ideological illusion, that we have a chance to build some alternative to this traditional European economic system. It’s not only a Greek phenomenon.
This new intellectual mood, my intuition is it’s risky for Europe. Especially this radical leftist illusion that you can build some alternative to this traditional European vision of the economy. I have no doubt frugality is an absolutely fundamental value and a reason why Europe is the most prosperous part of the world…. My fear is this ideological contagion is more risky than this financial one.
Tusk appeared to have dodged the question about Russia, so he was pressed again on whether he thought the Kremlin represents a problem when it comes to Greece.
The whole situation around Europe – Russia, of course, but the problem of migration and the unstable situation in the Mediterranean, terrorism – everything shows that the situation is very, very tentative. We can feel the European construction is quite fresh and fragile.
One of the most important parts of this new thinking about Europe is in fact something like questioning Europe as an idea, the EU as an organisation. From time to time, I feel that some politicians and some intellectuals in Europe are bored by the EU and they are ready to question everything, they’re ready to change everything in Europe, including treaties, but also this traditional way of thinking about Europe and our values. Russia is important, but maybe not the most important element of this threat. The most important is what we feel inside.
For me, the atmosphere is a little similar to the time after 1968 in Europe. I can feel, maybe not a revolutionary mood, but something like widespread impatience. When impatience becomes not an individual but a social experience of feeling, this is the introduction for revolutions. I think some circumstances are also similar to 1968.
The most impressive for me was this tactical alliance between radical leftists and radical rightists, and not only in the European Parliament…. The discussion about Greece, it means a discussion against austerity, a discussion against European tradition, anti-German in some part. Everything was provoking enthusiasm on both sides. It was quite symbolic.
It was always the same game before the biggest tragedies in our European history, this tactical alliance between radicals from all sides. Today, for sure, we can observe the same political phenomenon.
The main melody today is anti-European. When I say anti-European I mean this traditional thinking about the EU and European and the common currency, and of course anti-market, anti-liberal – in fact, something revolutionary. From time to time, I feel for them it doesn’t matter what kind of ideology it is.
Another interviewer asked Tusk if part of his concern about the political debate had to do with outside commentators like Paul Krugman, the economist and New York Times columnist who has been highly critical of the EU’s handling of the Greek crisis.
The debate, and the main actors in this debate, everything they say today is very attractive and spectacular and intellectually brilliant. Unfortunately, it has nothing to do with the political reality. It’s also very similar to 1968. For sure today we need fresh discussion and we have new challenges, so we need new arguments and new debate. But I’m absolutely sure what we need as our main need today is very pragmatic and realistic discussion about what we can do with our organisation, the EU and our currency.
If I look for something inspiring when it comes to the economy, I am ready to look towards something wise and responsible in different sources than this kind of debate. For me, maybe the best school of thinking is the so-called “ordoliberals” in Germany, in this critical time after the Second World War. Very pragmatic, no ideology, no illusions. Books and also practical politics from [Ludwig] Erhard, [Walter] Eucken, [Wilhelm] Röpke. This, for me, is the source of thoughts that can be very useful for today. Wilhelm Röpke thought – and I think it’s very relevant here today – we have too much Rousseau and Voltaire and not enough Montesquieu.
After this highly-charged criticism against the far-left, one of the reporters asked him how he could deal with Tsipras, leader of Europe’s most successful far-left political party, fairly if he felt radical leftist ideologies were undermining the EU. He argued that he felt free to discuss history and ideology with reporters, but it was not something he did as Council president.
My role here is not to discuss ideology or history…. This is the biggest risk, to be too ideological here in Brussels. I am totally sure that we need to avoid this risk of vision, radical visions of ideologies…. I tried to convince them we have to negotiate numbers, laws and guarantees and not emotions and ideologies.
The issue of debt relief was then raised. Tusk has been one of the most vocal EU leaders when it comes to the need for eurozone countries to provide some kind of debt relief for Athens, which would mean the eurozone bailout loans would have to be restructured. But Tusk did not renew that call, instead talking more broadly about global indebtedness, citing French economist Thomas Piketty, who has proposed a global conference on debt.
Today, I am absolutely convinced debt is a global problem not a Greek problem, not a European problem, but a global problem.
It’s not a Greek phenomenon, the debt problem. I’m not sure we need a discussion about debt relief for Greece. In fact, the whole process in the last five years…we had debt relief for Greece for five years. Maybe not nominal haircuts [on bailout loans], but in the private debt [there were] nominal haircuts. If we need a discussion about debt it’s not a discussion about Greece only. We have to be very cautious, because debt relief for Greece is very sensitive and risky topic in other countries.
Tusk was then asked more pointedly about criticisms coming out of Athens, as well as other quarters, that Tsipras was forced into tough austerity measures as a punishment for questioning the EU’s established order. This is where Tusk became the most emotional during the interview.
I can’t accept this argument, that someone was punished, especially Tsipras or Greece. The whole process was about assistance to Greece. I can’t understand. It’s more about some politicians and journalists and intellectuals than Greek politicians. I can hear this argument here in Brussels, in Paris and Berlin, also, about this humiliation, and Tsipras is the loser. It’s absurd.
Prime Minister Tsipras negotiated €80bn assistance for his country, successfully. When we discuss facts, deeds and numbers, this is the only number on the table: €80bn for Greek assistance, and quite soft conditions, in fact. Not only [soft] financial conditions, but political conditions — in fact, without collateral. Come on. What is the reason to claim it’s something humiliating for Greece, or this is punishment for Tsipras?
This is why I think the debate is more ideological than about facts and real politics.
While on the topic of the weekend negotiations, Tusk was asked how close, really, the eurozone came to Grexit over the course of the three days of talks. Several news organisations, including the Financial Times, reported that early Monday morning, Tsipras and Merkel were prepared to walk away from the talks. Tsipras had asked for 24 hours to go back to Athens and consult with allies, while Merkel suggested holding another summit on Wednesday. Tusk confirmed that it was the moment he felt it could have all fallen apart.
The first sign that Grexit was possible was, of course, the result of the eurogroup on Saturday. Not only because the lack of a result, but because of this new mood and new words – this last sentence in the document about a possible Grexit. But also because of the irritation of almost all of them.
After the referendum, this irritation was very tangible. It meant the position of Tsipras was weaker, in fact, after the referendum than before – here, maybe not in Athens, but for sure here. This privatisation fund was, for sure, very provocative for Tsipras. This complex situation, one day before the euro summit, was the first sign a dramatic [Grexit] solution is very possible.
In the [summit] negotiations, it was just one time when I felt the risk is really close, really possible or probable. It was about 7 o’clock in the morning, when both of them – Chancellor [Merkel] and Prime Minister Tsipras – they wanted a pause.
For me, it was absolutely clear this was the end of the negotiation. In fact, they wanted to stop this summit, but they were not ready to say ‘this is the end’, and it was an excuse. But it was very spontaneous. It’s also why it was so dangerous, because it was an authentic reaction, fatigue, also irritation. Both of them were absolutely sure they compromised too much.
It was a really interesting moment, because the difference at this very moment was so small. At this moment it was about €2.5bn. In the end, the discussion was about how much money – virtual money – from this privatisation fund would go to investment and how much to debt. The position of the chancellor was €10bn for investment, and for Tsipras it was €15bn. And the proposal was €12.5bn for investment. For both of them, it was about €2.5bn. At the same moment, they felt it was enough.
I told them, ‘If you stop this negotiation, I’m ready to say publicly: Europe is close to catastrophe because of €2.5bn.’
One of the reporters noted that despite his detailed recounting of the weekends’ events, he had not mentioned Fançois Hollande, the French president, who has publicly claimed his efforts helped prevent Grexit. Tusk was asked about Hollande’s role.
President Hollande was more neutral and objective, but I think it was his presumption from the very beginning that he’s dedicated to this process for a solution, not tough negotiation. The division of roles was very natural. It was for all of us absolutely clear that, in the end of this process, we have to agree between Greece and Germany. For many reasons, not only because of money. This was a chance for President Hollande not to be in charge or be an arbiter, but a very active person and very helpful when it comes to moderating or calming down the emotions. He was really helpful in this context, because of his temperament.
Another reporter got back to the early-morning meeting between Merkel and Tsipras where Tusk though they were both about to walk away and Grexit was imminent. Why did they change their minds and stay to hammer out a deal?
It was close to illumination: ‘Yes, it’s true, we are too close to leave this room.’ When they realised that, in fact, we have an agreement, and we have just one detail – I think this was very difficult to describe, because it’s just my impression, but I’m quite sure it was something like that. And we needed just 10 minutes to draft this last text.
Mark Rutte, the Dutch prime minister, was brought in by Tusk during one of the small group sessions, and one interviewer asked why he had taken the unusual decision to include the Dutchman in meetings that had previously the exclusive realm of Merkel, Hollande, Tsipras and the Greek finance minister, Euclid Tsakalotos.
At about 11 o’clock, it was clear that Germany was not the toughest country. Maybe not Germany, but for sure Chancellor Merkel was ready to compromise and some countries were afraid this compromise might be unacceptable to them or their parliaments. Everything was informal.
I received a signal that for a group of five member states: Rutte would be the best representative. I was naïve, of course, because I thought at midnight we would be ready with the compromise. I knew that I should be 100 per cent sure it was not only a compromise between Greece and Germany. I wanted to avoid this trap that some countries might ignore or oppose this possible compromise.
The role of Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary Fund chief, was then raised. After the summit was completed, it came to light that the IMF was deeply sceptical about the direction of Greece’s economy and whether a new bailout could succeed without massive debt restructuring. To many, it looked like a signal the IMF did not want to participate in a new bailout when its current programme expires, so Tusk was asked whether Lagarde had raised those concerns in the summit.
My impression was absolutely unambiguous that Lagarde is ready to participate in this programme, and it was undisputable in fact. The discussion was between Tsipras and others, but not about the possible participation of the IMF in the programme, but only about the form: Tsipras wanted to avoid – and I can understand why – the uncomfortable situation that we would have in the agreement the formulation that Greece wants to invite the IMF into the process. It was about words. It was clear to Tsipras he cannot be the initiator of the invitation, because of his obligation in his own party and in the Greek parliament.
But what it comes to Christine Lagarde and all of us, it was absolutely clear this was a condition for all member states – excluding Greece– that we are ready to agree to the third programme only if the IMF is inside. Christine Lagarde was also unambiguous in this.
As time began to run out, Tusk was asked if creditors had made a mistake not striking a deal with Antonis Samaras, Tsipras’ predecessor as prime minister, who was unable to complete Greece’s bailout at the end of his term because the IMF and ECB determined his government had not completed all the reforms they had promised. Instead, Samaras was forced to request a two-month extension of the bailout and call snap elections, leading to a Tsipras victory.
For sure, Samaras was more cooperative when it came to the substance of this cooperation on assistance and reforms. I think the process of negotiations on a possible third programme would have been easier. I think that’s nothing controversial. But I’m not sure the result of the last general election in Greece would have been different than what happened. I don’t like discussion after the fact. You have to be responsible, cautious and wise beforehand. It’s absolutely useless to pretend you’re the wiseguy after something happens.
Lastly, we again turned to the question if Monday’s deal would last. It only is an agreement that will lead to a reopening of bailout talks – it is not, in itself, a new bailout agreement. Is it possible summiteers could be back in Brussels before the summer is out?
I can’t exclude that we would have more summits also in the summer, but I hope [not]. The voting in Athens was, in fact, promising. Molotov cocktails are more attractive. It’s obvious Molotov cocktails are not a Greek invention. But support was really massive in parliament, and the demonstrations not so huge – visible and spectacular, but maybe this is a breakthrough in a mental context. I hope so.
Tags: Donald Tusk, EU summits, Greece
Posted in EU, Greece | Permalink
Donald Tusk interview: the annotated transcript
Peter Spiegel Author alerts
| Jul 16 23:01 | Comment | Share
Donald Tusk, the European Council president, listens to a question during Thursday's interview
After spending much of the six-month standoff between Greece and its eurozone creditors on the sidelines, Donald Tusk, the former Polish prime minister who is now European Council president, became the central actor in the Greek drama over the weekend when a summit he chaired became the scene of 17-hour marathon talks that finally led to a deal on Monday morning.
In a 90 minute interview with the Financial Times and six European newspapers, Tusk gave a behind-the-scenes account of how the deal was brokered – but he also gave voice to fears that the standoff has given new energy to radical political forces in Europe that has made 2015 resemble 1968. Our full write-up of the interview, focusing on his concerns about renewed radicalisation can be read here.
But as is our practice at the Brussels Blog, we’re providing a transcript of the interview below. It is slightly edited to eliminate occasionally long-winded questions and topics not directly related to the Greek crisis.
The interview started with a question on Germany and whether Tusk agreed with some commentators that Berlin’s standing in Europe has been hurt by perceptions Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, bullied Greece and its leader, Alexis Tsipras, into a deal on her terms.
I think the position in Germany today, after this negotiation, is maybe not weaker, but for sure not more powerful. It was one of my main aims in these negotiations, to avoid this risk that someone is a loser and someone is a winner, especially because as you noticed, for sure, the discussion during this economic negotiation was also about things like dignity, humiliation, trust. From history, we know very well that we can’t ignore such values, or such feelings or emotions like dignity, humiliation and trust, especially when we go back to German history. The discussion about dignity and humiliation could recall the most dangerous time in Europe, and this is why I think it’s very important to avoid this dimension in discussions and in negotiation because for sure what we needed was to have no losers and no winners in this context.
I’m quite sure that today the result, this agreement between eurozone member states, it’s something like a draw. It means no losers and no winners. It also means that there’s a very visible lack of enthusiasm. Nobody’s satisfied. But for sure, this is what I’m 100 per cent sure, that Germany is not the winner in the context of political power. The result is rather evidence that the eurozone and the whole EU is also an idea to limit natural advantages of some nations and some countries. At the end of the day, Germany has to sacrifice much more than other countries when it comes to numbers and money. This was the main subject of the whole process.
After this discussion about Germany, Tusk, unprompted, turned to Tsipras’ appearance last week in the European Parliament in Strasbourg. Tusk was also in the chamber reporting on the results of a Tuesday summit where Tsipras had been given five days to propose serious economic reforms or face bankruptcy. Tusk said he was struck by Tsipras’ second address to the parliament – which came after dozens of MEPs had weighed in on the crisis – where he engaged in some anti-German rhetoric.
Tsipras answered and his one mention was very interesting, because it was his opinion about a part of German history. He talked about Germany, after the first and second world wars, they experienced European solidarity and debt relief. And it was a little bit anti-German in tone, can I say, and the context was anti-German. And the reaction of parliamentarians, of the MEPs, was very, very enthusiastic. In fact, it looked like an anti-German demonstration when it came to the left side of the chamber and the radical right. It was the first time I saw radicals with such emotion, in this context anti-German emotion. It was almost half of the European Parliament. This is why I think nobody – but in particular Germany– are political winners in this process.
The interviewers stayed on the topic of Germany, with the next questioner asking about the role of Wolfgang Schäuble, the powerful German finance minister, who tabled a proposal that would have had Greece temporarily leave the eurozone. As a finance minister, Schäuble did not take part in the leaders summit, but Tusk joked: “My feeling is that he was around the table all the time.” Tusk then went on to describe what he believed was a strong difference in opinion between Schäuble and Merkel on the temporary Grexit proposal.
I’m quite sure that this thinking represented by Schäuble, but not only by Schäuble, this possible controlled and prepared Grexit, intellectually it’s legitimate. It’s nothing extravagant. For sure, this was a possible alternative in this process.
It’s just my intuition, but I think it’s also what Wolfgang Schäuble believes. I think he sent this message very openly and clearly that for Europe and for Greece it would be better that Greece is out. But I’m absolutely sure that for Chancellor Merkel, it was only a useful tool in negotiation, but for sure not her political aim. I have no doubts that for all of them, the leaders and Chancellor Merkel, the only political target was to avoid this risk of Grexit. For sure, this role of Schäuble was useful as an argument which showed to Tsipras that the dramatic solution is quite realistic and achievable.
The next questioner asked about the belief expressed by many officials that the deal Tusk brokered on Monday is unlikely to hold and that it only put off the risk of Grexit temporarily.
This agreement is not a guarantee for years. It was something we needed to avoid, this real risk of chaos and possible Greek bankruptcy – and, as a political result, also Grexit. But this is [not even] the first half in a football match, but the first step in a long-perspective work. For now, it works.
Yesterday, the voting in the Greek parliament was full of emotions and, for me, also a controversial message from Tsipras that he’s ready to support an agreement that he doesn’t believe in. That’s, in fact, very original. But I think it’s also very honest and authentic, because when I observed his face during the negotiations it was absolutely visible and tangible that he was not satisfied, and for him this is a really tough test. But it’s shows how difficult this process is and will be, for sure. But it shows also that, for now, it works.
We have no guarantees. This is an ongoing process with some traps, for sure. But what is my intention? It is to avoid today, and tomorrow, to avoid this very risky discussion about trust. We need more [technical] discussions and negotiations. Humiliation and trust and dignity, this is not [technical]. When we are discussing assistance and money for Greece, it’s very important to discuss something [technical] and not emotional and feelings.
In fact, negotiations should be about numbers, laws, procedures. The discussion about dignity, humiliation and trust, this is not a negotiation. It is an introduction to fight, always in our history. I can understand emotions and feeling, and not only on the Greek side. For sure, you observed clear and very strong emotions on Merkel’s face. Emotions, this is not a typically southern specialisation in politics. Cold, Hanseatic politicians are also, from time to time, very emotional.
I try to be realistic, not optimistic. But if we stop this discussion about emotions and values like dignity and humiliation – not to ignore them, but I’m absolutely sure it’s a very important part of politics – but at this very moment we need more pragmatic discussion than political or ideological. It would be too risk to judge who is more humiliated, who has more right to dignity.
Tusk was then asked about whether he had geopolitical concerns as he led the negotiations, particularly whether a Grexit could push Greece into the arms of Russia.
The most important subject of the negotiations was assistance to Greece. This was the first, second and third priority. But as a mid-term or long-term consequence of a possible Grexit, especially as a chaotic and unpredictable process, for sure we have to discuss the possible political consequences, and not only geopolitical consequences.
I was quite sure that there was no risk of financial contagion even if Greece is out. It wasn’t a slogan, it wasn’t propaganda when [ECB president Mario] Draghi and other institutions confirmed the eurozone is relatively safe today and the risk of contagion doesn’t exist. But for sure, after a dramatic event like Grexit, we could predict some political, ideological and geopolitical consequences.
I am really afraid of this ideological or political contagion, not financial contagion, of this Greek crisis. Today’s situation in Greece, including he result of the referendum and the result of the last general election, but also this atmosphere, this mood in some comments – we have something like a new, huge public debate in Europe. Everything is about new ideologies. In fact, it’s nothing new. It’s something like an economic and ideological illusion, that we have a chance to build some alternative to this traditional European economic system. It’s not only a Greek phenomenon.
This new intellectual mood, my intuition is it’s risky for Europe. Especially this radical leftist illusion that you can build some alternative to this traditional European vision of the economy. I have no doubt frugality is an absolutely fundamental value and a reason why Europe is the most prosperous part of the world…. My fear is this ideological contagion is more risky than this financial one.
Tusk appeared to have dodged the question about Russia, so he was pressed again on whether he thought the Kremlin represents a problem when it comes to Greece.
The whole situation around Europe – Russia, of course, but the problem of migration and the unstable situation in the Mediterranean, terrorism – everything shows that the situation is very, very tentative. We can feel the European construction is quite fresh and fragile.
One of the most important parts of this new thinking about Europe is in fact something like questioning Europe as an idea, the EU as an organisation. From time to time, I feel that some politicians and some intellectuals in Europe are bored by the EU and they are ready to question everything, they’re ready to change everything in Europe, including treaties, but also this traditional way of thinking about Europe and our values. Russia is important, but maybe not the most important element of this threat. The most important is what we feel inside.
For me, the atmosphere is a little similar to the time after 1968 in Europe. I can feel, maybe not a revolutionary mood, but something like widespread impatience. When impatience becomes not an individual but a social experience of feeling, this is the introduction for revolutions. I think some circumstances are also similar to 1968.
The most impressive for me was this tactical alliance between radical leftists and radical rightists, and not only in the European Parliament…. The discussion about Greece, it means a discussion against austerity, a discussion against European tradition, anti-German in some part. Everything was provoking enthusiasm on both sides. It was quite symbolic.
It was always the same game before the biggest tragedies in our European history, this tactical alliance between radicals from all sides. Today, for sure, we can observe the same political phenomenon.
The main melody today is anti-European. When I say anti-European I mean this traditional thinking about the EU and European and the common currency, and of course anti-market, anti-liberal – in fact, something revolutionary. From time to time, I feel for them it doesn’t matter what kind of ideology it is.
Another interviewer asked Tusk if part of his concern about the political debate had to do with outside commentators like Paul Krugman, the economist and New York Times columnist who has been highly critical of the EU’s handling of the Greek crisis.
The debate, and the main actors in this debate, everything they say today is very attractive and spectacular and intellectually brilliant. Unfortunately, it has nothing to do with the political reality. It’s also very similar to 1968. For sure today we need fresh discussion and we have new challenges, so we need new arguments and new debate. But I’m absolutely sure what we need as our main need today is very pragmatic and realistic discussion about what we can do with our organisation, the EU and our currency.
If I look for something inspiring when it comes to the economy, I am ready to look towards something wise and responsible in different sources than this kind of debate. For me, maybe the best school of thinking is the so-called “ordoliberals” in Germany, in this critical time after the Second World War. Very pragmatic, no ideology, no illusions. Books and also practical politics from [Ludwig] Erhard, [Walter] Eucken, [Wilhelm] Röpke. This, for me, is the source of thoughts that can be very useful for today. Wilhelm Röpke thought – and I think it’s very relevant here today – we have too much Rousseau and Voltaire and not enough Montesquieu.
After this highly-charged criticism against the far-left, one of the reporters asked him how he could deal with Tsipras, leader of Europe’s most successful far-left political party, fairly if he felt radical leftist ideologies were undermining the EU. He argued that he felt free to discuss history and ideology with reporters, but it was not something he did as Council president.
My role here is not to discuss ideology or history…. This is the biggest risk, to be too ideological here in Brussels. I am totally sure that we need to avoid this risk of vision, radical visions of ideologies…. I tried to convince them we have to negotiate numbers, laws and guarantees and not emotions and ideologies.
The issue of debt relief was then raised. Tusk has been one of the most vocal EU leaders when it comes to the need for eurozone countries to provide some kind of debt relief for Athens, which would mean the eurozone bailout loans would have to be restructured. But Tusk did not renew that call, instead talking more broadly about global indebtedness, citing French economist Thomas Piketty, who has proposed a global conference on debt.
Today, I am absolutely convinced debt is a global problem not a Greek problem, not a European problem, but a global problem.
It’s not a Greek phenomenon, the debt problem. I’m not sure we need a discussion about debt relief for Greece. In fact, the whole process in the last five years…we had debt relief for Greece for five years. Maybe not nominal haircuts [on bailout loans], but in the private debt [there were] nominal haircuts. If we need a discussion about debt it’s not a discussion about Greece only. We have to be very cautious, because debt relief for Greece is very sensitive and risky topic in other countries.
Tusk was then asked more pointedly about criticisms coming out of Athens, as well as other quarters, that Tsipras was forced into tough austerity measures as a punishment for questioning the EU’s established order. This is where Tusk became the most emotional during the interview.
I can’t accept this argument, that someone was punished, especially Tsipras or Greece. The whole process was about assistance to Greece. I can’t understand. It’s more about some politicians and journalists and intellectuals than Greek politicians. I can hear this argument here in Brussels, in Paris and Berlin, also, about this humiliation, and Tsipras is the loser. It’s absurd.
Prime Minister Tsipras negotiated €80bn assistance for his country, successfully. When we discuss facts, deeds and numbers, this is the only number on the table: €80bn for Greek assistance, and quite soft conditions, in fact. Not only [soft] financial conditions, but political conditions — in fact, without collateral. Come on. What is the reason to claim it’s something humiliating for Greece, or this is punishment for Tsipras?
This is why I think the debate is more ideological than about facts and real politics.
While on the topic of the weekend negotiations, Tusk was asked how close, really, the eurozone came to Grexit over the course of the three days of talks. Several news organisations, including the Financial Times, reported that early Monday morning, Tsipras and Merkel were prepared to walk away from the talks. Tsipras had asked for 24 hours to go back to Athens and consult with allies, while Merkel suggested holding another summit on Wednesday. Tusk confirmed that it was the moment he felt it could have all fallen apart.
The first sign that Grexit was possible was, of course, the result of the eurogroup on Saturday. Not only because the lack of a result, but because of this new mood and new words – this last sentence in the document about a possible Grexit. But also because of the irritation of almost all of them.
After the referendum, this irritation was very tangible. It meant the position of Tsipras was weaker, in fact, after the referendum than before – here, maybe not in Athens, but for sure here. This privatisation fund was, for sure, very provocative for Tsipras. This complex situation, one day before the euro summit, was the first sign a dramatic [Grexit] solution is very possible.
In the [summit] negotiations, it was just one time when I felt the risk is really close, really possible or probable. It was about 7 o’clock in the morning, when both of them – Chancellor [Merkel] and Prime Minister Tsipras – they wanted a pause.
For me, it was absolutely clear this was the end of the negotiation. In fact, they wanted to stop this summit, but they were not ready to say ‘this is the end’, and it was an excuse. But it was very spontaneous. It’s also why it was so dangerous, because it was an authentic reaction, fatigue, also irritation. Both of them were absolutely sure they compromised too much.
It was a really interesting moment, because the difference at this very moment was so small. At this moment it was about €2.5bn. In the end, the discussion was about how much money – virtual money – from this privatisation fund would go to investment and how much to debt. The position of the chancellor was €10bn for investment, and for Tsipras it was €15bn. And the proposal was €12.5bn for investment. For both of them, it was about €2.5bn. At the same moment, they felt it was enough.
I told them, ‘If you stop this negotiation, I’m ready to say publicly: Europe is close to catastrophe because of €2.5bn.’
One of the reporters noted that despite his detailed recounting of the weekends’ events, he had not mentioned Fançois Hollande, the French president, who has publicly claimed his efforts helped prevent Grexit. Tusk was asked about Hollande’s role.
President Hollande was more neutral and objective, but I think it was his presumption from the very beginning that he’s dedicated to this process for a solution, not tough negotiation. The division of roles was very natural. It was for all of us absolutely clear that, in the end of this process, we have to agree between Greece and Germany. For many reasons, not only because of money. This was a chance for President Hollande not to be in charge or be an arbiter, but a very active person and very helpful when it comes to moderating or calming down the emotions. He was really helpful in this context, because of his temperament.
Another reporter got back to the early-morning meeting between Merkel and Tsipras where Tusk though they were both about to walk away and Grexit was imminent. Why did they change their minds and stay to hammer out a deal?
It was close to illumination: ‘Yes, it’s true, we are too close to leave this room.’ When they realised that, in fact, we have an agreement, and we have just one detail – I think this was very difficult to describe, because it’s just my impression, but I’m quite sure it was something like that. And we needed just 10 minutes to draft this last text.
Mark Rutte, the Dutch prime minister, was brought in by Tusk during one of the small group sessions, and one interviewer asked why he had taken the unusual decision to include the Dutchman in meetings that had previously the exclusive realm of Merkel, Hollande, Tsipras and the Greek finance minister, Euclid Tsakalotos.
At about 11 o’clock, it was clear that Germany was not the toughest country. Maybe not Germany, but for sure Chancellor Merkel was ready to compromise and some countries were afraid this compromise might be unacceptable to them or their parliaments. Everything was informal.
I received a signal that for a group of five member states: Rutte would be the best representative. I was naïve, of course, because I thought at midnight we would be ready with the compromise. I knew that I should be 100 per cent sure it was not only a compromise between Greece and Germany. I wanted to avoid this trap that some countries might ignore or oppose this possible compromise.
The role of Christine Lagarde, the International Monetary Fund chief, was then raised. After the summit was completed, it came to light that the IMF was deeply sceptical about the direction of Greece’s economy and whether a new bailout could succeed without massive debt restructuring. To many, it looked like a signal the IMF did not want to participate in a new bailout when its current programme expires, so Tusk was asked whether Lagarde had raised those concerns in the summit.
My impression was absolutely unambiguous that Lagarde is ready to participate in this programme, and it was undisputable in fact. The discussion was between Tsipras and others, but not about the possible participation of the IMF in the programme, but only about the form: Tsipras wanted to avoid – and I can understand why – the uncomfortable situation that we would have in the agreement the formulation that Greece wants to invite the IMF into the process. It was about words. It was clear to Tsipras he cannot be the initiator of the invitation, because of his obligation in his own party and in the Greek parliament.
But what it comes to Christine Lagarde and all of us, it was absolutely clear this was a condition for all member states – excluding Greece– that we are ready to agree to the third programme only if the IMF is inside. Christine Lagarde was also unambiguous in this.
As time began to run out, Tusk was asked if creditors had made a mistake not striking a deal with Antonis Samaras, Tsipras’ predecessor as prime minister, who was unable to complete Greece’s bailout at the end of his term because the IMF and ECB determined his government had not completed all the reforms they had promised. Instead, Samaras was forced to request a two-month extension of the bailout and call snap elections, leading to a Tsipras victory.
For sure, Samaras was more cooperative when it came to the substance of this cooperation on assistance and reforms. I think the process of negotiations on a possible third programme would have been easier. I think that’s nothing controversial. But I’m not sure the result of the last general election in Greece would have been different than what happened. I don’t like discussion after the fact. You have to be responsible, cautious and wise beforehand. It’s absolutely useless to pretend you’re the wiseguy after something happens.
Lastly, we again turned to the question if Monday’s deal would last. It only is an agreement that will lead to a reopening of bailout talks – it is not, in itself, a new bailout agreement. Is it possible summiteers could be back in Brussels before the summer is out?
I can’t exclude that we would have more summits also in the summer, but I hope [not]. The voting in Athens was, in fact, promising. Molotov cocktails are more attractive. It’s obvious Molotov cocktails are not a Greek invention. But support was really massive in parliament, and the demonstrations not so huge – visible and spectacular, but maybe this is a breakthrough in a mental context. I hope so.
Tags: Donald Tusk, EU summits, Greece
Posted in EU, Greece | Permalink
