A provincial shuffle shows the power of China’s president
IMAGINE an American election in which two-thirds of the senators and three-quarters of the state governors up for re-election are defeated. It would be a landside to end all landslides. (When Ronald Reagan won 98% of the electoral-college votes in the presidential election of 1984, only four Senate seats changed hands out of 33 races). Yet this is the level of turnover happening now at the provincial level in China, without the democracy: ballot papers dropped ceremoniously into large red boxes create a mere semblance of it.
Since the start of 2016 China’s president, Xi Jinping, has replaced 20 of the Communist Party’s 31 provincial secretaries, as the most powerful leaders at that level are known. He has also shuffled 27 of the provincial governorships (governors are second-in-command). For local leaders, April was the cruellest month: ten jobs changed hands. By the autumn, almost every province will have felt the effects—including Hong Kong, where a new leader was named in March. (That process, too, was hardly democratic.)
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Party secretaries and governors normally serve for five years, so in any one year you would expect a dozen or so to retire or change jobs. The number tends to rise towards the middle of a national leader’s ten-year term of office—a point at which wide-ranging shuffles normally take place at every level. Mr Xi is at that stage of his tenure (assuming he follows convention and steps down as general secretary in 2022). But the scale of his recent shake-up has been unusual. Between January 2006 and May 2007—the comparable midway period in the rule of his predecessor, Hu Jintao—12 party secretaries and 11 governors were replaced, only half the number shifted during the past 16 months.
Some recent changes have been related to the incumbents’ age: 12 of those replaced, including the party secretaries of nine provinces, were about 65 years old, when senior officials normally retire. Two of the leaders were dismissed for alleged corruption: the governor of Sichuan in the south-west, and the party boss in Tianjin, a city near Beijing with provincial status. As often happens, seven governors replaced their departing party chiefs.
Total control
So 21 of the changes were to some extent required by age, criminality or term limit (though Mr Xi presumably had some influence both over the anti-corruption charges and the promotion of governors). That leaves 25 changes which seem to have been made at Mr Xi’s discretion. Why would he want to move so many people?
The answer relates to a national party congress, which is due to be held in the second half of 2017. Such meetings happen every five years. They are a little like an American presidential election, in that they change the elite that makes up the national government. The congress will appoint a new Central Committee of around 370 people including provincial and national leaders. Like an American election, it will involve infighting and score-settling.
Mr Xi’s appointments in the provinces help him directly and indirectly. Almost all the party chiefs and governors will become members of the Central Committee, if they are not already. The more who owe their power to Mr Xi, the better for him. Unlike his predecessor, Mr Xi was not the head of an established political faction when he took over as general secretary in 2012, so he had to create his own. The new provincial leaders help him do that.
They also play an important role in preparations for the congress, including the choosing of more than 2,000 delegates and setting the agenda—the meeting will discuss a state-of-the-nation report by Mr Xi and adopt revisions to the party’s charter. With his provincial appointments, Mr Xi is putting in place those who can ensure that the right people attend the congress, say the right things and vote the right way.
Just because Mr Xi has promoted someone does not necessarily mean he or she is a close ally. Chinese politics is riven by factions, and Mr Xi sometimes has to make appointments to appease rivals or for other reasons. The choice of the new governor of Inner Mongolia, for example, looks like a case of buttering up a powerful local family. Bu Xiaolin, the person in question, is the daughter and grand-daughter of previous heads of the provincial government.
With the retirement of the party chief of the coastal province of Zhejiang, Xia Baolong, Mr Xi has also lost a powerful ally in the regions. Mr Xia stepped down in April after a career that included a spell as deputy to Mr Xi when he was the province’s party chief between 2002 and 2007. Overall, though, Mr Xi has gained a lot. Two of the new party secretaries held high office in Shanghai when he led the party there in 2007-08. Three of them, as well as two of the new mayors of provincial cities, worked with him in Zhejiang. Others with ties to him from the same period have different senior posts, such as the president of Baosteel, a large state-owned firm. They are likely to get promotions at the congress or soon after.
Analysts are divided in their assessment of what Mr Xi hopes to achieve at the meeting and the extent to which he will get his way (some believe he would like to lay the groundwork for extending his rule beyond 2022). But the churn of provincial bosses has shown that Mr Xi enjoys growing influence within a powerful tier of the leadership. This must make it more likely that he will emerge even stronger.
This article appeared in the China section of the print edition under the headline "A hand up for Xi’s people"
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